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Liability Relationships: Pushing the Frontiers of
the Law of Claim Preclusion
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ABSTRACT
This article sheds light on an evolving area of preclusion
law—nonmutual claim preclusion and the related issue of privity between
parties to a vicarious liability relationship—that merits scholarly attention
and greater doctrinal clarity. To illustrate, if an injured party asserts a
negligence claim against a truck driver, and judgment is rendered against
the injured party based on a finding of the driver’s nonnegligence, may the
driver’s employer invoke claim preclusion or issue preclusion in a
subsequent action by the injured party? Are the employer and his
employee in privity with each other despite the lack of mutuality? When
this fact pattern actually became the subject of a sample multiple-choice
question published in 2014 by the National Committee of Bar Examiners,
several procedural scholars responded that a plausible case could be made
for either of two of the four choices—claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
Their various responses reveal a need to provide a measure of coherence
to this corner of preclusion law.
These differing doctrinal views raise three significant issues
addressed in this article. First, does claim preclusion bar the suit against
the truck driver’s employer or only issue preclusion? Second, if the
employer can reap the benefits of claim preclusion, is nonmutual claim
preclusion available in the first instance or only as a fallback if issue
preclusion is unavailable? Third, to the extent that nonmutual claim
preclusion is applicable, is it justified doctrinally as an extension of privity
to include employee and employer or as an exception to privity?
This Article proposes that adding derivative liability relationships to
the recognized categories of substantive legal relationships that “are
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sometimes collectively referred to as ‘privity’”1 and applying nonmutual
claim preclusion, even where issue preclusion would otherwise have been
available, is—and as a matter of policy should be—the next logical step in
the evolution of preclusion law.
The law of preclusion has evolved progressively beyond the formalist
rule of mutuality that traditionally served as the basis for the so-called
“narrow and broad exceptions” to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. As a
consequence of the erosion of mutuality, a substantial number of American
jurisdictions apply those exceptions to claim preclusion by expanding the
concept of privity to include vicarious liability relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, in anticipation of the expanded coverage of the Multistate
Bar Examination to include civil procedure, the National Committee of Bar
1. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 n.8 (2008).
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Examiners (NCBE) published ten sample questions and answers, one of
which sparked a controversy among several civil procedure academics who
agreed that two of the four choices are arguably correct. This question
focuses on an evolving, and somewhat incoherent, area of civil procedure
common law—claim and issue preclusion in the context of vicarious
liability relationships.2 Are parties to those relationships in privity so that
either may invoke nonmutual claim preclusion, rather than nonmutual issue
preclusion? Here is the question (hereinafter referred to as “Question 9”):
A motorcyclist was involved in a collision with a truck. The motorcyclist
sued the truck driver in state court for damage to the motorcycle. The jury
returned a verdict for the truck driver, and the court entered judgment. The
motorcyclist then sued the company that employed the driver and owned
the truck in federal court for personal-injury damages, and the company
moved to dismiss based on the state-court judgment. If the court grants the
company’s motion, what is the likely explanation?
(A) Claim preclusion (res judicata) bars the motorcyclist’s action against
the company.
(B) Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) establishes the company’s lack
of negligence.
(C) The motorcyclist violated the doctrine of election of remedies.
(D) The state-court judgment is the law of the case.3

The NCBE states that choice (A)—“claim preclusion”—is the correct
answer. It explains that “the company is in privity with the truck driver
(based on the employer-employee relationship)” and “[t]herefore, the first
2. Vicarious liability is defined as “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an
employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an
employee) based on a relationship between the two persons.” Vicarious Liability, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Examples of vicarious liability relationships include:
[T]hat of master and servant, wherein the master is liable for certain wrongs
committed by the servant in the course of his employment; owner and driver of a
motor vehicle when applicable law makes the owner responsible for injuries
resulting from the driver’s use of the vehicle with the owner’s permission;
principal and agent for matters within the scope of the agency relationship;
principal contractor and sub-contractor to the extent the former is responsible for
the conduct of the latter; co-obligors of a contract to the extent that the
performance of the contract is the responsibility of both; property owner and
person occupying the property with his consent with regard to injuries to third
persons for which the property owner has a non-delegable responsibility; insurer
and insured with respect to liabilities covered by the insurance agreement; and
perhaps others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
3. MBE Civil Procedure Sample Test Questions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS
3 (2016), http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbex.org2Fdms
document2F16 [https://perma.cc/V7AP-K9CK].
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judgment extinguishes the claim against the company . . . .”4 Choice
(B)—issue preclusion—was labeled “incorrect.”5 Aside from the fact that
“the jury’s general verdict for the truck driver does not necessarily establish
that he was free from negligence” since “[i]t may instead reflect the jury’s
conclusion that the motorcyclist was more negligent than the truck driver,”
the NCBE’s answer opines that “the court is not likely to base its ruling on
issue preclusion because that defense will be utilized only if claim
preclusion is unavailable.”6
Quite apart from the problematic aspect of a multiple-choice question
to which there are arguably two correct answers,7 this question, and its
answer, highlight the lack of doctrinal clarity that plagues this evolving
area of preclusion law. After the NCBE published Question 9 and its
proposed answer, four legal scholars responded with a range of disparate
views on the correct application of preclusion doctrine. Three issues
emerged from this range of responses. First, does claim or issue preclusion
bar the suit against the truck driver’s employer? Second, if the employer,
who was not a party to the first suit against the driver, can reap the benefits
of claim preclusion, is nonmutual claim preclusion only available where
issue preclusion is not? Third, to the extent that nonmutual claim
preclusion is available, is it doctrinally justified as an extension of privity to
include employee and employer or as an exception to privity? However,
notwithstanding these disparate views on doctrine, all four academics agree
that preclusion—whether claim or issue—bars the second suit in Question
9’s fact pattern.
Therefore, before turning to an exposition of these four responses, it is
reasonable to ask why it matters whether the same result is reached through
claim or issue preclusion. While these issues might seem to be
hair-splitting, they are not. As I will conclude, allowing the use of claim
preclusion in the first instance (rather than as a fallback if issue preclusion
is not available) is more efficient. Additionally, redefining the indemnity
relationship as within the definition of privity, as opposed to an exception
to it, leads to a more coherent understanding of what we are trying to
accomplish when we include certain relationships under the umbrella of
privity.

4. Id. at 10.
5. Id.
6. Id. (emphases added).
7. See, e.g., Posting of Allan Ides, allan.ides@lls.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu
(Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with author) (“I do agree that the issue preclusion alternative, which
is also correct under a non-mutual estoppel principle, muddies the question and renders it an
ineffective testing tool.”).
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The varied responses to Question 9 by Professors Freer, Clermont,
Green, and Ides are best understood as falling on a continuum of preclusion
doctrine. On the “issue-preclusion-only” end of this doctrinal continuum,
Professor Freer asserts that claim preclusion is not available at all to a
nonparty indemnitor or indemnitee based on a prior judgment against the
injured party because, “if employer and employee were in privity for claim
preclusion purposes, there was no reason for the courts to have developed
the narrow exception to mutuality.”8 The roots of the “narrow exception”
were firmly planted in a doctrine that, today, has been abandoned by most
states and the federal courts—mutuality of estoppel.9 The narrow
exception effected one of the earliest erosions of the mutuality doctrine as
it pertained to issue preclusion.10 “For many years, most courts” followed
the rule of mutuality, which prescribed that
the favorable preclusion effects of a judgment were available only to a
person who would have been bound by any unfavorable preclusion
effects[,] . . . establish[ing] a pleasing symmetry—a judgment was binding
only on parties and persons in privity with them, and a judgment could be
invoked only by parties and their privies.11

Most jurisdictions have since abandoned the mutuality rule in favor of
nonmutual issue preclusion.12 The narrow exception—“the most important
departure from mutuality,” which stemmed from indemnification
relationships—“makes the benefits of preclusion available to anyone who,
if defeated in the second action, would be entitled to demand
indemnification from the party who won the first action.”13 For example, if

8. Posting of Richard D. Freer, rfreer@emory.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Nov.
11, 2015) (on file with author). Professor Freer provides the following example:
In Case 1, P sues Driver. The parties litigate and Driver wins a valid final
judgment on the merits, because the fact-finder expressly finds that Driver was not
negligent. In Case 2, P sues Owner, asserting that Owner is vicariously liable for
Driver’s negligence. Owner cannot have Case 2 dismissed under claim
preclusion.
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.3, at 577 (2d ed. 2009). This is “[b]ecause one
requirement for claim preclusion is that Case 1 and Case 2 be brought by the same claimant
against the same defendant.” Id. at 577 n.154.
9. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2D § 4463, at 679 (2d ed.
2002).
10. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 655 (7th ed. 2016).
11. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 677.
12. Id. at 679 n.4 (citations omitted) (indicating that only twelve states still follow the
mutuality rule).
13. Id. at 681.
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the court entered a judgment of nonnegligence in favor of an employee
who allegedly committed a tortious act within the scope of his
employment, that judgment would have issue preclusive effect in a
subsequent vicarious liability suit against the employer.14 The narrow
exception seeks to avoid what would otherwise be
an impossible choice between unacceptable alternatives. If a second action
can be maintained against the indemnitee [(e.g., an employer sued on a
vicarious liability claim based on the tortious conduct of his employee, the
indemnitor)], either the indemnitee must be allowed to assert his right of
indemnification or the right must be defeated by the judgment in favor of
the indemnitor.15

In application, many courts expand the narrow exception beyond its
indemnification rationale and “into a rule that has often been identified as
the ‘broad exception’ to the requirement of mutuality.”16 Under the broad
interpretation, “either party to a vicarious liability relationship” enjoys the
preclusion benefit of a judgment “in favor of the other.”17 Thus, if the
indemnitee (e.g., an employer) were sued first on a vicarious liability claim
and won a judgment, the indemnitor (e.g., the employee whose alleged
tortious conduct formed the basis of the employer’s alleged vicarious
liability) could preclude relitigation of the employee’s negligence.18 As
explained by Wright, Miller, and Cooper: “The broad exception by
definition does not entail the special needs of indemnification that justify
the narrow exception, since no harm is done by holding the indemnitor
liable following victory by the indemnitee.”19 Beginning with the
landmark decision in Bernhard v. Bank of America,20 most jurisdictions
have abandoned the mutuality rule entirely as a requirement for issue
preclusion.21 Professor Freer’s view that claim preclusion is not at all
available to a nonparty indemnitor or indemnitee appears to be based on
two premises: (1) that claim preclusion, unlike issue preclusion, still
requires mutuality and (2) that there is no privity between parties to a

14. See id.
15. Id. at 683 (“To allow the right of indemnification would be to destroy the victory
won by the indemnitor in the first action. To deny the right of indemnification would be to
destroy the indemnitee’s right by the result of an action in which he took no part. It is far
better to preclude the third person, who has already had one opportunity to litigate, and who
often could have joined both adversaries in the first action.”).
16. Id. at 689.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 690.
20. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
21. See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 10, at 656–57 (citing id.).
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vicarious liability relationship because, otherwise, there would have been
“no reason for the courts to have developed the narrow exception to
mutuality.”22
As discussed in Section II.C, the privity concept has expanded beyond
its narrow formalist origins to embrace a functional analysis.23 This
functional analysis creates room for adding derivative liability to the
existing categories of substantive legal relationships that amount to
privity.24 The survey of relevant caselaw in Section II.A reveals that most
jurisdictions that apply nonmutual claim preclusion do so as an extension of
privity rather than as an exception to it.
Moving along the doctrinal continuum toward nonmutual claim
preclusion, Professor Clermont’s response to Question 9 agrees that
indemnitors and indemnitees lack privity between each other.25 However,
he does not agree that nonmutual claim preclusion is never available in
derivative liability relationships.26 Under this view, claim preclusion is
available to the indemnitee-employer, but only where issue preclusion is
not otherwise applicable because the previous judgment, such as a
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order or for a failure to
prosecute, did not decide any issues on the merits.27 Professor Clermont
takes issue with the view expressed in the NCBE’s suggested answer to
Question 9 that the issue preclusion defense “will be utilized only if claim
preclusion is unavailable.”28 He notes that “[e]very court I have seen goes
the standard nonmutual IP [issue preclusion] route if it is available.”29
Furthermore, this limited application of claim preclusion is not justified as
an extension of privity but as an exception to the mutuality requirement of
22. Posting of Richard D. Freer, rfreer@emory.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Nov.
11, 2015) (on file with author).
23. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4448, at 326 (“Both the privity label
and the mutuality rule are losing their former capacity to deter functional analysis.”).
24. See 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.40[3][a], at 131-137 (3d ed. 2016)
(“[Privity] describes those relationships that the courts have already determined will qualify
for preclusion.”).
25. Patricia W. Moore, Questioning the Sample MBE Civil Procedure Questions, CIV.
PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (Aug. 22, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/08/
questioning-the-sample-mbe-civil-procedure-questions.html
[https://perma.cc/FBN5SNWC] (providing Professor Clermont’s email response to Question 9).
26. Id.
27. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 684.
28. MBE Civil Procedure Sample Test Questions, supra note 3, at 10.
29. Patricia W. Moore, supra note 25. With respect to the NCBE’s suggested answer to
Question 9, Professor Clermont commented, “I think you could argue for Answer 1 (CP) or
Answer 2 (IP), but in no way is Answer 1 right and Answer 2 wrong. I would have
answered Answer 2. I can’t say that Answer 1 is wrong, however.” Id.
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privity denominated “nonmutual claim preclusion,”30 which extends the
narrow and broad exceptions to issue preclusion to claim preclusion as
well.31
Moving further toward the claim preclusion end of the continuum,
Professor Michael Green agrees with Professors Freer and Clermont that
privity does not exist between indemnitor and indemnitee.32 However,
unlike Professor Clermont, he contends “that nonmutual claim preclusion
will often bar a plaintiff from suing an employer under respondeat superior
if he already sued an employee concerning the same transaction and
lost . . . . Non-mutual claim preclusion is commonly allowed in such
cases.”33 This view is consistent with the narrow exception.34
Finally, reaching the claim preclusion end of the continuum, Professor
Ides comments that “the claim is precluded under the Restatement (Second)
[of Judgments § 51], which purports to state the majority view of the law,
and under the long-recognized vicarious liability (substantive legal
relationship) exception to the ‘parties-only’ requirement, which is the
source of the Restatement’s standard.”35
As explained in Part I of this Article, the Second Restatement of
Judgments’ position on the preclusive effect of judgments as between
parties to vicarious liability relationships has evolved since the original
Restatement. The position now allows “Persons Having a Relationship in
Which One Is Vicariously Responsible for the Conduct of the Other” to
invoke the benefits of claim preclusion, regardless of who is sued first.36
Thus it effectively encompasses both the broad and narrow exceptions to
claim preclusion,37 based on the premise that claims against the indemnitee
30. Id. (“The claim against employer is a different claim from the one against
employee, and the E’er and E’ee are not in privity. The argument for CP is nonmutual
CP.”).
31. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 689 (“[The broad
exception] has been extended to claim preclusion.”).
32. Q.9 of the MBE Sample Questions, MICHAEL GREEN’S CIVPRO BLOG (Aug. 29,
2014),
http://michaelstevengreen.typepad.com/blog/2014/08/q-9-of-the-mbe-samplequestions.html [https://perma.cc/GPD6-36C9].
33. Id. (citing Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1502–03 (11th
Cir. 1990)).
34. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 681–87.
35. Posting of Allan Ides, allan.ides@lls.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Nov. 11,
2015) (on file with author).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
37. The Second Restatement of Judgments provides:
If two persons have a relationship such that one of them is vicariously
responsible for the conduct of the other, and an action is brought by the injured
person against one of them, the judgment in the action has the following
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and indemnitor constitute but a single claim.38 The foregoing disparate
responses to MBE Question 9, which reflect a range of views on the state
of preclusion in the derivative liability setting, raise three distinct issues
which this Article aims to address. First, do most jurisdictions, explicitly
or implicitly, apply the Second Restatement’s approach, whether as an
extension of privity or as a nonmutual exception to privity? Second, do the
jurisdictions that apply nonmutual claim preclusion do so by expanding the
privity concept to include what I have termed nonmutual or unilateral
privity,39 or by applying the broad or narrow exceptions to privity? Third,
do jurisdictions that apply nonmutual claim preclusion in vicarious liability
situations do so even where issue preclusion would also be an option—i.e.,
when the indemnitor’s liability had been litigated and determined by the
prior judgment—or only as a last resort, i.e., when issue preclusion would
not otherwise be available? Part I provides historical context for
considering these issues by shedding light on the evolution of the positions
taken by the Restatements of Judgments on nonmutual claim preclusion in
the context of vicarious liability relationships. Part II surveys the national
landscape of caselaw among the states and federal circuits in this area of
preclusion law.
Section II.A reveals that a very substantial number of jurisdictions,
state and federal, explicitly or implicitly apply the Second Restatement’s
position on nonmutual claim preclusion. Section II.B focuses on the extent
to which jurisdictions that adopt nonmutual claim preclusion do so, not as a
last resort, but in the first instance. This article contends that applying
claim preclusion over issue preclusion is consistent with section 51 of the

preclusive effects against the injured person in a subsequent action against the
other.
(1) A judgment against the injured person that bars him from reasserting his
claim against the defendant in the first action extinguishes any claim he has
against the other person responsible for the conduct unless:
(a) The claim asserted in the second action is based upon grounds that
could not have been asserted against the defendant in the first action; or
(b) The judgment in the first action was based on a defense that was
personal to the defendant in the first action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
38. Id. § 51 cmt. b (“In an important sense, however, there is only a single claim.”).
39. Also denominated by Wright, Miller, and Cooper as “bogus privity.” WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4464.1, at 716 n.4. “One means adopted to accomplish
nonmutual claim preclusion is to state that the party invoking preclusion is in privity with a
party to the earlier action although the circumstances would not support a finding of privity
to invoke preclusion against the new party.” Id. at 716.
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Second Restatement of Judgments and is the most direct means40 of
realizing the purpose behind the narrow and broad exceptions to mutuality
of estoppel. Section II.C addresses whether jurisdictions that adopt the
Second Restatement’s position do so on the basis of what I call nonmutual
privity or “bogus privity,”41 or as a nonmutual preclusion exception to
privity. Section II.C demonstrates that a substantial number of jurisdictions
frame their analyses in terms of privity between indemnitor and
indemnitee, as confirmed by Moore’s Federal Practice and Procedure.42 I
conclude that the broad and narrow exceptions to privity are vestiges of a
formalistic, restrictive view of privity that tethered the recognition of
qualifying relationships to the outmoded concept of mutuality, and that the
goal of a simplified and more coherent approach to nonmutual claim
preclusion in the context of vicarious liability relationships would be better
served by adding those relationships to the existing categories of
“substantive legal relationship[s]” commonly recognized as constituting
privity.43 This nonmutual privity concept presumes the existence of privity

40. See id. § 4463, at 684 (“Claim preclusion often provides the simplest means of
avoiding successive actions against the indemnitor and then against the indemnitee.”).
41. Id. § 4464.1, at 716 n.4. “One means adopted to accomplish nonmutual claim
preclusion is to state that the party invoking preclusion is in privity with a party to the
earlier action although the circumstances would not support a finding of privity to invoke
preclusion against the new party.” Id. at 716.
42. 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 131.40[3][f].
43. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“[N]onparty preclusion may
be justified based on a variety of pre-existing ‘substantive legal relationship[s]’ between the
person to be bound and a party to the judgment.”). The Court in Taylor further provided:
The substantive legal relationships justifying preclusion are sometimes
collectively referred to as “privity.” The term “privity,” however, has also come
to be used more broadly, as a way to express the conclusion that nonparty
preclusion is appropriate on any ground. To ward off confusion, we avoid using
the term “privity” in this opinion.
Id. at 894 n.8 (citations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51
(subsumes “Persons Having a Relationship to Which One Is Vicariously Responsible for the
Conduct of the Other” under the general category of “Substantive Legal Relationships
Resulting in Preclusion”). Privity in the preclusion context has also been described as:
[A] nonparty’s rights may be concluded when his or her substantive legal right is
so defined that it stands or falls according to a judgment involving another who
was a party to prior litigation. Persons falling within [this] category were
traditionally referred to as being in “privity” with the party to the judgment. This
remains useful as a general descriptive term but it must be used with great caution.
To say that a person is in “privity” with a party signifies only that the relation
between them is such that the judgment involving the party may justly be
conclusive on the one who is not a party. The problem remains: What
relationships justify that consequence?
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in vicarious liability relationships, which can be overcome where
circumstances would lead to an unjust result. Such unjust results exist in
cases where “[t]he claim asserted in the second action . . . could not have
been asserted against the defendant in the first action,” or where “[t]he
judgment in the first action was based on a defense that was personal to the
defendant in the first action.”44
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RESTATEMENTS OF JUDGMENTS FROM
NONMUTUAL ISSUE PRECLUSION TO NONMUTUAL CLAIM PRECLUSION
The Second Restatement of Judgments broadened the scope of
nonmutual preclusion in vicarious liability relationships far beyond the
narrow confines of the original Restatement of Judgments, which clung to
the fast-eroding mutuality rule.45 Section 96 of the Restatement of the Law
of Judgments, promulgated in 1942, limited the scope of nonmutual
preclusion to the narrow exception and further limited its application
exclusively to issue preclusion:
SUCCESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST TORTFEASORS WHERE DUTY
OF INDEMNITY.
(1) Where two persons are both responsible for a tortious act, but one of
them, the indemnitee, if required to pay damages for the tort, would be
entitled to indemnity from the other, the indemnitor, and the injured
person brings an action against the indemnitor because of such act, a
valid judgment (a) for the defendant on the merits for reasons not
personal to the defendant terminates the cause of action against the
indemnitee . . . .46

Section 96 was located under Topic 2 dealing with “Persons Not
Parties or Privies,” indicating that this section was intended as an exception

FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 11.23, at 714 (5th ed. 2001).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
45. See, e.g., JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 43, § 11.25, at 716 (citation
omitted) (“The [mutuality] rule . . . remained almost universally recognized, though often
criticized, until 1942, when it was repudiated in the leading case of Bernhard v. Bank of
America.” (citing Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal.
1942)); see also Antonio Gidi, Loneliness in the Crowd: Why Nobody Wants Opt-Out Class
Members to Assert Offensive Issue Preclusion Against Class Defendants, 66 SMU L. REV. 1,
5 n.12 (2013) (noting that “Bernhard opened a new path, while the first A.L.I. Restatement
of Judgments embraced the old tradition of mutuality” and that “the first Restatement of
Judgments [had been criticized as] ‘out of step with the times.’” (quoting FLEMING JAMES,
JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.31, at 597 (1st ed. 1965))).
46. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 (AM. LAW. INST. 1942).
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to the requirement of privity under the rule of mutuality.47 Section 96
embodied the narrow exception by limiting this mutuality exception to
judgments in favor of the indemnitor “terminat[ing] the cause of action
against the indemnitee.”48 Comment a of Section 96 explains that the
exception applied to issue preclusion, not claim preclusion49: “[A] person
should not be entitled to litigate the same issue in more than one action.
This second principle is limited to litigation with the same adversary, since
normally a person is entitled to relitigate an issue where the adversary is a
different person.”50
Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments, promulgated in
1982 when most jurisdictions had abandoned the mutuality rule,51
expanded the scope of nonmutual preclusion in vicarious liability situations
to include nonmutual claim preclusion:
If two persons have a relationship such that one of them is vicariously
responsible for the conduct of the other, and an action is brought by the
injured person against one of them, the judgment in the action has the
following preclusive effects against the injured person in a subsequent
action against the other. (1) A judgment against the injured person that
bars him from reasserting his claim against the defendant in the first action
extinguishes any claim he has against the other person responsible for the
conduct . . . .52

47. Id. § 96 cmt. a (“Relitigation of an issue with a new adversary is permitted because
of the assumed unfairness of binding one party to a proceeding by the rules of res judicata
while the other party is not bound: where there is a new adversary who was not privy to the
first action, since the second adversary would not be bound by the rules of res judicata, the
person who was a party to the first proceeding should not be bound either. This desirability
for equality between litigating parties with reference to the rules of res judicata is not,
however, of pervading importance and disappears when there are countervailing reasons for
requiring one to be bound while the other is not.” (emphasis added)).
48. Id. § 96.
49. Id. § 96 cmt. a. The term res judicata is often used to refer to both claim and issue
preclusion. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of
a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively
referred to as ‘res judicata.’”).
50. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 cmt. a (emphases added).
51. By 1980, only twelve jurisdictions adhered to the mutuality rule. See, e.g., WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 679 n.4 (“One list of fourteen jurisdictions that
“still cling to the mutuality rule” is provided in [Janet Schmitt Ellis, Note, Nonmutuality:
Taking the Fairness Out of Collateral Estoppel, 13 Ind. L. Rev. 563, 566 n.22 (1980)]. It is
typical of the pace of change in this area that two of the states listed had formally abandoned
the mutuality requirement during the period in which the Note must have been written.”).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (emphasis
added).
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Unlike Section 96 of the first Restatement, Section 51, located under
Chapter 4 entitled “Parties and Other Persons Affected by Judgments,”
dispenses entirely with the term “privity.”53 In further contrast to Section
96, Section 51 expands the preclusive effect of a judgment with respect to
vicarious liability relationships to include claim preclusion. The text of this
section defines the preclusive impact of the prior judgment in terms of
“extinguish[ing]” the injured person’s claim rather than “terminat[ing] the
cause of action.”54 In contrast to the Rationale of Section 96 of the original
Restatement, Section 51’s Rationale omits reference to issues litigated in
the prior action, focusing instead on the functional reality that the claim
against the primary obligor (i.e., the indemnitor) and the persons
vicariously responsible for his conduct (i.e., the indemnitee) are “[i]n an
important sense . . . only a single claim.”55 Although the Reporter’s Note
acknowledges:
The results of most of the cases, indeed, could equally well be subsumed
under the rule of § 29 [of the original Restatement], precluding a person
who has unsuccessfully litigated an issue against one adversary from
relitigating it against another . . . . [T]here is substantial authority that a
judgment adverse to the claimant precludes the subsequent action even
when the issues tendered in the second action were not actually determined
in the first action.56

Further broadening the application of nonmutual claim preclusion,
Section 51 encompasses both the broad exception as well as the narrow
exception.57 This suggests a policy concern that extends “beyond the
53. Id.
54. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 cmt. b. (emphasis added) (“The same
loss is involved, usually the same measure of damages, and the same or nearly identical
issues of fact and law. . . . The optional additional security thus afforded by rules of
vicarious responsibility should not . . . afford the injured person a further option to litigate
successively the issues upon which his claim to redress is founded. He is ordinarily in a
position to sue both obligors in the same action and may justly be expected to do so.”).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 reporter’s note on cmt. b.
57. Id. § 51 cmt. b, illus. 1. Section 51 provides the following illustration:
P is injured while riding as a passenger in a taxicab owned by T and driven
by C. P brings an action against T, alleging that C was negligent and that T was
responsible as owner of the cab. T does not dispute that he is chargeable with C’s
negligence but successfully defends on the ground that C was not negligent. P is
precluded from bringing an action against C based on C’s operation of the taxicab.
Id. Wright, Miller, and Cooper provide the following comments on the Second
Restatement’s approach:
The Restatement Second of Judgments . . . blend[ed] the broad exception and the
narrow exception into a single set of rules . . . . It might have been better to
abolish the broad exception, so that nonmutual use of ordinary claim- and
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special needs that arise from indemnification,”58 to include promoting
judicial economy and discouraging harassment of defendants by
“encourag[ing] joinder of multiple defendants in a single action.”59 Finally,
in light of my proposal in Section II.C that vicarious liability relationships
be added to the category of substantive legal relationships constituting
privity, it is also noteworthy that Section 51 is located under Topic 2 of
Chapter 4, which addresses “Substantive Legal Relationships Resulting in
Preclusion” and includes classic examples of privity relationships
categorized in Taylor v. Sturgell.60
II. CLAIM PRECLUSION IN VICARIOUS LIABILITY RELATIONSHIPS IN
STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS: THE NATIONAL LANDSCAPE
The national survey of caselaw presented in Section II.A supports
Wright, Miller, and Cooper’s conclusion that “[t]here . . . is substantial
authority in favor of nonmutual claim preclusion in derivative liability
relationships, without regard to the special problems of indemnification.”61
However, this survey does not support Wright, Miller, and Cooper’s
position concerning the theoretical underpinning of nonmutual claim
preclusion, i.e., whether to consider the application of claim preclusion to
non-parties in a vicarious liability relationship as an exception to the
requirement of privity—the so-called narrow and broad exceptions—or,
rather, as an extension of privity—albeit a unilateral or nonmutual one.
Wright, Miller, and Cooper characterize the courts’ use of the term
“privity” to describe the relation between indemnitor and indemnitee as
“bogus privity” because privity traditionally requires “mutuality”—that the
party invoking preclusion based on a favorable judgment must have been at
risk of being bound by an unfavorable judgment.62 However, most of the
jurisdictions cited in the survey frame nonmutual claim preclusion in terms
of privity, rather than as an exception to the privity requirement.
issue- preclusion rules is available only within the limits of the narrow exception.
Nonmutual preclusion in all other circumstances would be limited by the same
general requirements of justice and fairness, subject to recognition of the fact that
justice and fairness may have distinctive dimensions in dealing with vicarious
liability relationships.
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 691 (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. § 4463, at 691 (“The result is to extend nonmutual claim preclusion and ordinary
rules of issue preclusion beyond the special needs that arise from indemnification
relationships.”).
59. Id.
60. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008).
61. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4464.1, at 713.
62. See id. § 4464.1, at 716 n.4.
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Section II.C contends that the time has come to broaden the privity
concept in the context of vicarious liability relationships by jettisoning, as a
sine qua non of privity, the mutuality requirement—a vestige of the
formalist, and now mostly abandoned, rule of mutuality of estoppel—and
by including vicarious liability relationships as an additional category to
the list of substantive legal relationships.63 As discussed in Section II.B,
the survey reveals that a significant number of courts have applied claim
preclusion, rather than issue preclusion, where the latter was nevertheless a
viable alternative because issues raised in the subsequent suit had actually
and necessarily been determined in the previous action.
A. Jurisdictions that Apply Claim Preclusion in Vicarious Liability
Relationships
This Section demonstrates that a substantial body of caselaw, both
state and federal, supports nonmutual claim preclusion consistent with the
Second Restatement of Judgments.
1.

State Jurisdictions

Most of the following state jurisdictions, explicitly or implicitly, adopt
Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments’ approach to claim
preclusion.
Alabama: Alabama is one of the few jurisdictions that still applies
mutuality of estoppel64 and recognizes “privity” as an exception to the
mutuality rule.65 However, its Court of Civil Appeals, in Thompson v.

63. See Richards v. Jefferson, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996). In Richards, the Court
explained:
Of course, these principles do not always require one to have been a party to
a judgment in order to be bound by it. Most notably, there is an exception when it
can be said that there is “privity” between a party to the second case and a party
who is bound by an earlier judgment. For example, a judgment that is binding on
a guardian or trustee may also bind the ward or the beneficiaries of a trust.
Moreover, although there are clearly constitutional limits on the “privity”
exception, the term “privity” is now used to describe various relationships
between litigants that would not have come within the traditional definition of that
term.
Id. (emphases added).
64. Thompson v. SouthTrust Bank, 961 So. 2d 876, 883 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (“It is
noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that
parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.”
(quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F. Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D. Ala. 1995), rev’d in part on
other grounds, 88 F.3d 1554 (11th Cir. 1996))).
65. Thompson, 961 So. 2d at 883.
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SouthTrust Bank,66 adopted the equivalent of the broad exception. Citing
Section 51, federal common law, as well as the law of other states,
Thompson ruled that “employer-employee or principal-agent relationships
may ground a claim preclusion defense, regardless which party to the
relationship was first sued.”67 The court held that the employees of a bank
sued by plaintiff in connection with a failed transaction could successfully
invoke claim preclusion based on a summary judgment in favor of the bank
in a prior action by plaintiff.68 Applying a “substantial identity”69 privity
test that turns on “whether the relationship between the parties was close
enough,”70 the Alabama court ruled:
Because the adjudication in the previous lawsuit in SouthTrust’s favor was
based not on defenses that were personal to SouthTrust, but upon defenses
that were applicable to the employees, Turner and Nicholson, through
whom SouthTrust acted, Turner and Nicolson are in privity with
SouthTrust with regard to that adjudication . . . [and, therefore] the trial
court did not err when it entered a summary judgment in Turner’s and
Nicolson’s favor on the basis of their affirmative defense of res judicata.71

Alaska: In DeNardo v. Barrans,72 the Alaska Supreme Court labeled
as privity the vicarious liability relationship between a state agency and its
employees, relying on Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments
“in determining whether privity exists for res judicata purposes.”73 The
court precluded plaintiff’s wrongful termination claims against the agency
based on the prior judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims against agency
employees:
Because the [Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education] and the
[Alaska Student Loan Corporation] are governmental entities, not
individuals, and so could not act except through their officers and
employees, their liability could only be established vicariously, through
proof that their officers and employees (the individual defendants named in
DeNardo’s complaint) acted wrongfully. Under these circumstances,
privity arises between the agency defendants, who had not been sued in
federal court, and the individual defendants, all of whom were sued for
actions taken in the course of their employment, because their relationship
is ‘such that one of them is vicariously responsible for the conduct of the
66.
67.
1989)).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 876.
Id. at 887 (quoting Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1288 (5th Cir.
Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id. at 888–89.
DeNardo v. Barrans, 59 P.3d 266 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 270 n.22.
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other.’ It follows that, by precluding DeNardo’s individual claims, we also
must preclude his agency claims.74

Arizona: Following an automobile accident in which the front left tire
of the injured plaintiff’s car was allegedly defective, plaintiff asserted a
product liability claim against the seller of the tire.75 The tire seller settled
the suit with an offer of judgment.76 In plaintiff’s subsequent action against
the manufacturer, the federal district court, citing Section 51 of the Second
Restatement of Judgments as well as “Arizona public policy [that] favors
joining in one action all known and available tortfeasors as defendants,”
held that an offer of judgment accepted by plaintiff in a products liability
suit against the seller of a defective tire precluded plaintiff’s claim against
the manufacturer.77 Privity was not mentioned nor was issue preclusion
available because no issues had been determined by the judgment in the
prior suit.
Connecticut: In Tibbetts v. Stempel,78 the federal district court,
applying Connecticut law, ruled that plaintiff’s claims against Yale School
of Divinity were precluded by a judgment in favor of employees of the
Divinity School who had acted in the scope of their employment.79 The
court applied the “privity principle”80 expressed in Moore’s Federal
Practice81 that “[g]enerally, an employer-employee or agent-principle [sic]
relationship will provide the necessary privity for claim preclusion with
respect to matters within the scope of the relationship, no matter which
party is first sued.”82
Florida: In St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. v. Cormier,83 St. Jude sued
Medtronic, a competitor, for “tortiously interfering with its business
relationship” with Joe Cormier, a St. Jude employee.84 St. Jude’s claimed
74. Id. at 270.
75. Manjarres v. Cont’l Tire N. Am., Inc., No. CV 06-1037-PHX-MHM, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18452, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2007).
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id. at *20.
78. Tibbetts v. Stempel, 354 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Conn. 2005).
79. Id. at 148–49.
80. Id. at 148 (“In its modern form, the principle of privity bars relitigation of the same
cause of action against a new defendant known by a plaintiff at the time of the first suit
where the new defendant has a sufficiently close relationship to the original defendant to
justify preclusion.” (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa
S.A., 56 F.3d 359, 367–68 (2d Cir. 1995))).
81. 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 131.40[3][f].
82. Tibbetts, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (quoting 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 24, § 131.40[3][f]).
83. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Cormier, 745 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2014).
84. Id. at 326–27.
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that Medtronic was vicariously liable for the acts of its employee, Annette
Cormier.85 After arbitrating its claims with Medtronic, St. Jude sued
Annette for related claims.86 Annette moved for judgment on the
pleadings, claiming protection under res judicata.87 Although Florida still
adheres to the mutuality rule,88 the court held that St. Jude’s vicarious
liability claims were barred by res judicata, finding, in privity terms, that
the “identity of the parties” requirement was satisfied.89 Florida law
follows the general principle that “bars a ‘plaintiff from relitigating his
claim against the servant when a judgment has been entered in a prior suit
brought against the master involving the same issues,’”90 but only “when
the master is not guilty of any independent or concurrent wrong, but must
be held, if at all, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”91 The court
also noted:
The district court stated in a footnote that collateral estoppel “likely”
applied because “St. Jude is seeking to recover additional damages based

85. Id. at 328.
86. Id. at 327.
87. Id. at 326.
88. See Massey v. David, 831 So. 2d 226, 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“In order for
res judicata or collateral estoppel . . . to apply, Florida requires ‘mutuality’ and ‘identity of
parties.’ Identity of parties and mutuality do not exist unless the same parties or their
privies participated in prior litigation that eventuated in a judgment by which they are
mutually bound. Even if not named as a party, a party may be deemed a participant in prior
litigation for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel, but only if the party is bound by
the final judgment entered to the same extent as the named parties.” (second emphasis
added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
89. St. Jude, 745 F.3d at 328.
90. Id. (quoting Hinton v. Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 317 So.2d 832, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975)).
91. St. Jude, 745 F.3d at 328–39 (quoting Hinton, 317 So.2d at 838). See also West v.
Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., 595 So. 2d 92, 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (“In Phillips v.
Hall . . . the court held that a plaintiff was barred by res judicata from suing an employee of
a supermarket in a negligence action for injuries caused by the employee’s negligent
operation of a hand-powered merchandise cart. The plaintiff had previously sued the
employee’s employer [the supermarket] and had recovered a judgment for the same injuries
arising out of the same accident. Although the employee was not a party to the prior
negligence action against his employer, he was nonetheless allowed to raise the defense of
res judicata based on the judgment entered in the prior action. The court adopted the
rationale of a New Hampshire case which reached the same result upon the theory that in
master/servant vicarious liability cases, the master and servant are not joint tortfeasors, and,
consequently, a plaintiff who elects to sue only one of these two potentially liable parties for
a single wrong may not receive a judgment against one party and thereafter attempt to
pursue the other.” (citing Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974))).
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on the same facts alleged in the Florida Arbitration.” However, the district
court did not decide the issue, and this court declines to consider it.92

Georgia: Although Georgia is one of the few remaining states that
follows the mutuality rule, Georgia law recognizes that “‘a master has
privity with his servant and can claim the benefit of an adjudication in
favor of the servant [but] a servant is not in privity with the master so as to
be able to claim the benefit of an adjudication in favor of the master.’”93
Accordingly, in Sorrells Construction Company v. Chandler Armentrout &
Roebuck, P.C.,94 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
holding “that plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of its claim against the
principal barred pursuit of its claim against the agent.”95 Instead, the Court
of Appeals held that “unless an agent and principal otherwise have the
‘mutual or successive relationship to the same rights’ necessary to establish
privity, the general rule that a servant is not in privity with his master
applies for purposes of claim preclusion.”96 Thus, Georgia appears to
adopt what amounts to the narrow exception, but does so in terms of
privity. As a further limitation, Georgia law appears to restrict nonmutual
claim preclusion to cases where issue preclusion is not otherwise
applicable.97
Illinois: Illinois law adopts the equivalent of the broad exception, but
does so in terms of privity between employee and employer. In Towns v.
Yellow Cab Company,98 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a judgment
involuntarily dismissing an injured taxicab passenger’s suit against the cab

92. St. Jude, 745 F.3d at 330 (quoting St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Cormier, Civil No.
12-2098 (DWF/JSM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61477, at *17 n.5 (D. Minn. May 7, 2013),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 745 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2014)).
93. Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chandler Armentrout & Roebuck, P.C., 447 S.E.2d 101, 103
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Gilmer v. Porterfield, 212 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1975)).
94. Id. at 101.
95. Id. at 102. The court further observed:
[T]he result in the trial court in this case exemplifies the danger of blindly taking
rules or exceptions applicable to issue preclusion and applying them to claim
preclusion: the promulgation of a rule which would make it impossible to
voluntarily dismiss a claim against a principal without losing the claim against the
agent, even though settlements and voluntary dismissals are clearly desirable.
Id. at 103.
96. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Block v. Woodbury, 438 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1993)).
97. Sorrels Constr. Co., 447 S.E.2d at 102–03 (“As no issues were litigated and
necessarily decided when plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its action against the City, the
possibility of applying issue preclusion is easily eliminated. Thus, if plaintiff’s action is to
be barred, it would have to be on the basis of claim preclusion.”).
98. Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 382 N.E.2d 1217 (Ill. 1978).
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company, for violating a court order to answer interrogatories, precluded
the passenger’s subsequent claim against the cab driver.99 Although the
decision did not cite Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments,
the court’s analysis aligns with Section 51’s “single claim” rationale:
[T]he rule has evolved that a judgment for either the master or servant,
arising out of an action predicated upon the alleged negligence of the
servant, bars a subsequent suit against the other for the same claim of
negligence where the agency relationship is not in question. This result
obtains even though the defendant in the subsequent suit was not a party to
the first action and despite the fact the cases find that a master and servant
are technically not in privity . . . .
....
. . . . When an action is brought against a master based on the alleged
negligent acts of his servant, and no independent wrong is charged on
behalf of the master, his liability is entirely derivative, being founded upon
the doctrine of respondeat superior. In this regard, it has been said that the
liability of the master and servant for the acts of the servant is deemed that
of one tortfeasor and is a consolidated or unified one. As such, any legal
claim against the master must be said to be identical to that which the
plaintiff may have asserted against the servant.100

99. Id. at 1223. See also Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878–79 (7th Cir. 2008).
In Muhammad, claims against the chief executive officer of two companies, previously sued
by the same plaintiff, were deemed precluded by res judicata based on the judgment in a
previous suit dismissing the claims against the companies. Id. Applying the equivalent of
the broad exception, the court stated:
[W]hen respondeat superior is the sole asserted basis of liability against a master
for the tort of his servant an adjudication on the merits in favor of either the
master or servant precludes suit against the other. The rule developed as an
offshoot of the doctrine of res judicata. Although a master and his servant are not
technically in privity, the preclusive principles underlying res judicata were
thought to have equal application in the respondeat superior setting because the
operative facts and law controlling a servant’s direct liability are always identical
to those that determine the vicarious liability of his master (so long as the agency
relationship and its scope are not in dispute). If the master is vicariously liable,
the servant must be directly liable (and vice versa); if the master is not vicariously
liable, the servant cannot be directly liable (and vice versa). The Towns doctrine
is established law in Illinois.
Id. at 879 (quoting Bachenski v. Malnati, 11 F.3d 1371, 1377–78 (7th Cir. 1993)).
100. Towns, 382 N.E.2d at 1221 (citations omitted). Other decisions applying Illinois
law frame the employer-employee vicarious liability relationship in terms of privity. See
Berry v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 00 C 5538, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19286, at
*37–40 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2003). There, the court explained:
Defendants contend that the claims of Diab and Hayes are barred by res
judicata (claim preclusion) in that they could have raised their present claims in
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The Seventh Circuit also noted “‘[t]he Towns doctrine is established
law in Illinois.’ (And not only in Illinois; see Peppmeier v. Murphy, 708
N.W.2d 57, 63–64 (Iowa 2005).”101
Iowa: In Criterion 508 Solutions, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Services,
Inc.,102 the federal district court, applying the privity label, extended the
application of Section 51 beyond the derivative liability relationship.103

the administrative review cases that they litigated in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois. . . .
....
An issue exists . . . as to whether the identity of parties requirement is
satisfied. IDHS was a party to the administrative review cases, but the individual
defendants were not. . . . However, Illinois courts hold that, where the employer’s
liability is based on vicarious liability, the employee and employer are in privity
for purposes of res judicata. . . . Also, finding privity to exist in such situations
would be consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51 (1982). . . .
In the administrative review cases, any “liability” on the part of IDHS would be
based on the conduct of IDHS officials and employees being attributed to IDHS.
It appears that, in the present situation, Illinois courts would find the individual
defendants to be in privity with IDHS and therefore res judicata would apply.
Id. (third and fifth emphases added) (citations omitted). In another Illinois case, the Seventh
Circuit explained:
The third element of res judicata . . . is an identity of parties or their privies in the
earlier and later suits. The defendant in the appellant’s state court suit was the
Village of Lombard. The defendants in his federal action include, in addition, the
village major, the village manager, and several trustees of the village. A
government and its officers are in privity for purposes of res judicata.
Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphases added).
101. Muhammad, 547 F.3d at 879 (quoting Bachenski v. Malnati, 11 F.3d 1371,
1377–78 (7th Cir. 1993)).
102. Criterion 508 Sols., Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Servs., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 1078
(S.D. Iowa 2009).
103. Id. at 1095. See also Golden v. Barenbord, 53 F.3d 866, 870–71 (7th Cir. 1995). In
Golden, the court reasoned:
The second requirement of res judicata, identity of parties, is also
satisfied . . . .
Coldwell was acting on behalf of Salomon and Barenborg pursuant to
arrangements each appellee had with Coldwell in effectuating the sale of
Barenborg’s home. Therefore, through an agency-principal relationship, Coldwell
was granted the authority to sell Barenborg’s home to Golden. In finding that
Coldwell was an agent, the broad settlement agreement releasing Coldwell would
also release the appellees as principals . . . . [T]he Illinois Supreme Court held that
any settlement between the agent and the plaintiff extinguished the principal’s
vicarious liability. Since Golden released Coldwell from further liability, his
vicarious liability claims against the appellees must fail.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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The court observed “[a]s long as there is sufficient privity between the
parties, Iowa courts have applied Section 51 on several occasions” and that:
Section 51 applies not only in vicarious liability situations, but also when
there is sufficient privity between the parties to merit extending claim
preclusion to a non-original suit party. This is especially true in instances
where the losses and damages are similar, and “the same or nearly identical
issues of fact and law” are present. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 51 cmt. b. Here, the facts demonstrate that there is sufficient
similarity between the claims Criterion is alleging against Lockheed and
Brooks [Lockheed’s independent contractor and the defendant in the prior
suit], similar damages, and only superficial differences between issues of
fact and law. Additionally, Lockheed and Brooks are in privity because
Criterion’s claims against Lockheed are based on tortious acts Brooks
committed while working as an independent contractor for Lockheed. All
of the facts indicate that Criterion is suing Lockheed as the functional
equivalent of Brooks and Criterion “cannot show any good reasons to
justify a second chance.”104

Kentucky: In Wayne County Hospital v. Jakobson,105 a hospital patient
won a verdict against the hospital relating to the negligence of a doctor
employed by the hospital.106 The hospital subsequently sued the doctor
seeking indemnification and then unsuccessfully moved for summary
judgment based on both claim and issue preclusion.107 The Sixth Circuit
addressed the hospital’s claim preclusion argument first before moving on
to issue preclusion.108 While citing Kentucky law and Section 51 of the
Second Restatement of Judgments for the proposition that “generally
accepted principles of res judicata recognize that judgments concerning
persons having a relationship in which one is vicariously responsible for
the conduct of another may have preclusive effect under certain
circumstances,”109 the court declined to apply claim preclusion.110 Instead,
it agreed with the district court’s determination that “the Hospital’s notice
to Dr. Jakobson two weeks before the Hardwick trial that it intended to
104. Criterion, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (emphases added) (quoting WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 9, § 4464.1, at 724). See also Peppmeier v. Murphy, 708 N.W.2d 57,
64 (Iowa 2005) (holding that prior summary judgment in favor of physician-defendant in
medical malpractice action by patient, based on the lack of admissible evidence to create a
genuine issue of physician’s negligence, precluded patient’s claim against the hospital on
basis of respondeat superior).
105. Wayne Cty. Hosp. v. Jakobson, 567 F. App’x 314 (6th Cir. 2014).
106. Id. at 314.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 317.
109. Id. at 318.
110. Id. at 321.
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seek indemnification from him in the event of the plaintiff’s verdict
‘suggests an antagonistic posture rather than an identity of
interest . . . . ’”111
Louisiana: Although Louisiana does not extend res judicata to
vicarious liability relationships, it functionally achieves the same result
through the doctrine of judicial estoppel.112 In Williams v. Marionneaux,113
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff’s cause of action abates
against the person secondarily liable when it is shown that he has already
litigated with the tortfeasor or tortfeasors and they have been held to be
without fault. Accordingly, a plea in bar of judicial estoppel would have
been appropriate procedurally.”114 Judicial estoppel is “generally applied
to parties to the prior actions or their privies. In some instances, involving
vicarious liability resulting from employer-employee and lessor-lessee
relationships, it has been held that the requirement of identity of parties
may be waived in the application of judicial estoppel.”115
Maryland: In another case applying the equivalent of the broad
exception, a surgeon suffered summary judgment in his defamation suit
against the hospital where he was previously employed on the grounds,
inter alia, that “none of the statements relied upon [by the plaintiff had]
been published to a legally distinct third party.”116 The surgeon then sued
two of the hospital’s nurses, asserting the same defamation claims.117 The
Maryland Court of Appeals held: “As we shall conclude that . . . all counts
were barred by res judicata, we shall not reach the parties’ arguments with
respect to collateral estoppel and limitations.”118 The court framed the
relationship between the hospital and its two nurses in terms of privity:

111. Id. (quoting Wayne Cty. Hosp. v. Jakobson, Civil No. 09-44-GFVT, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 137819, at *14 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 29, 2010), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 314 (6th Cir.
2014)).
112. Baker v. Wheless Drilling Co., 303 So. 2d 511, 514 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (“Although
the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Louisiana has been criticized,
questioned, and soundly rejected by one Court of Appeal, it continues to find acceptance in
the opinions of the state’s highest court.” (citations omitted)).
113. Williams v. Marionneaux, 124 So. 2d 919 (La. 1960), overruled by Sampay v.
Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326, 329 (La. 1981).
114. Id. at 922.
115. Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129, 139 (La. 1974).
116. deLeon v. Slear, 616 A.2d 380, 383 (Md. 1992) (quoting deLeon v. St. Joseph
Hosp., CA-86-1609-H (D. Md. filed May 22, 1986), aff’d, 871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 825 (1989)).
117. deLeon, 616 A.2d at 383.
118. Id. at 385; see also id. at 387 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51
(AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
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This Court has not squarely decided whether an employee is in privity with
his employer, for purposes of res judicata, where a plaintiff brings a tort
suit for damages against the employer, loses in the action against the
employer, and then sues the employee for damages based upon tortious
conduct occurring in the scope of employment and constituting the same
“claim” as that involved in the earlier action. Numerous other courts have
addressed the issue, however, and have concluded that res judicata bars the
plaintiff’s suit against the employee in this situation.119

In addition to citing decisions of several states and federal courts, the
deLeon opinion also cites Section 51 of the Second Restatement of
Judgments.120
Michigan: Michigan law adopts Section 51’s approach to claim
preclusion in vicarious liability relationships. In Lamie v. Wright,121 the
federal district court adopted the Magistrate’s recommendation precluding
plaintiff’s claims against Wright and Cereska, employees of PW Services, a
professional fiduciary, based on a prior probate court judgment which
rejected plaintiff’s claim to property owned by his father, known as the Taft
Road property.122 Although it appears that the material issue—plaintiff’s
rights to ownership of his father’s real estate—was determined against
plaintiff in the probate court, possibly justifying application of issue
preclusion, the federal district court agreed that “plaintiff’s claims
concerning the Taft Road real property and personal property contained

119. deLeon, 616 A.2d at 385–86.
120. Id. at 387; see also Cognate Bioservs., Inc. v. Smith, Civil No. CCB-13-1797, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30649 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2016). In a suit by Cognate alleging
misappropriation of trade secrets or products by Smith Consulting and MacroCure, the court
held that Smith Consulting was in privity with Smith, the party against whom Cognate
counterclaimed in a prior state court suit. Id. The court stated:
The amended complaint alleges that Smith acted as the agent of Smith
Consulting, his wholly-owned company. . . . According to the Restatement
[(Second) of Judgments § 51 (1982)] and Maryland law, these allegations are
sufficient to establish that Smith Consulting is vicariously liable for Smith’s
conduct. In the state court case, Cognate brought several counterclaims against
Smith and lost. Therefore, the judgment against Cognate, the “injured person” in
the Restatement definition, “extinguishes” any claim the plaintiffs have against
Smith Consulting . . . .
Id. at *15–16. Although the court explicitly found that a material fact essential to Cognate’s
claim had been decided against Cognate in its earlier counterclaim, the court applied claim
preclusion, rather than issue preclusion, to Cognate’s claim against Smith Consulting and
only applied issue preclusion to Cognate’s claim against MacroCure, “even if the plaintiffs’
claims against MacroCure are not barred by res judicata.” Id. at *18.
121. Lamie v. Wright, Case No. 1:12-cv-1299, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93818 (W.D.
Mich. June 4, 2014), adopted by 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92191 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 2014).
122. Id. at *10–11.
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thereon were barred by res judicata arising from the Muskegon County
Probate proceedings.”123 The court concluded:
Plaintiff’s claims against Cereska and Wright in the foregoing counts are
clearly barred by the doctrine of res judicata, arising both from the Probate
Court judgment and from Chief Judge Maloney’s final judgment in LaMie
v. Smith, case no. 1:12-cv-201. Under both Michigan law and federal law,
the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, provides that a final
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies
from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in the previous
action . . . . Although neither Cereska nor Wright were parties to the
previous two lawsuits, their employer, PW Services, was a party. The
application of res judicata does not require an identity of parties. Rather,
the parties need only be in privity or in a relationship, such as that between
employer and employee, in which one party is vicariously liable for the acts
of the other. See [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (AM. LAW
INST. 1982)]. Both the federal courts and the Michigan courts hold that an
employee acting within the scope of his employment is entitled to invoke
the doctrine of res judicata defensively when a plaintiff sues the employee
after having unsuccessfully litigated the same claims against the
employer.124

Nevada: In Spector v. El Ranco, Inc.,125 the Ninth Circuit held:
Where . . . the relations between two parties are analogous to that of
principal and agent, the rule is that a judgment in favor of either, in an
action brought by a third party, rendered upon a ground equally applicable
to both, is to be accepted as conclusive against the plaintiff’s right of action
against the other. Since there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the
Hotel as Graham’s principal, Graham was entitled to raise this judgment as
a bar to appellant’s action as against him.126

While this statement of the law appears to embrace the broad
exception, the opinion does not explicitly refer to claim or issue preclusion.
However, given the favorable resolution of the issue of the employee’s
negligence, either preclusion doctrine was applicable.127
New Hampshire: In Fiumara v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Cos.,128 in
an intentional infliction action by plaintiff against an insurance company,
insurance investigators, and a testing laboratory, the First Circuit held that
an earlier judgment in a suit filed against the insurance company alone
barred plaintiff’s claims against the insurance investigators and the testing
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *9–10 (fourth emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Spector v. El Ranco, Inc., 263 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1959).
Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
Id.
Fiumara v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 746 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1984).
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laboratory based on both claim and issue preclusion.129 The court noted
that, “[w]hile [the investigators and the testing laboratory] were not parties
to the state suit, the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel, both
in the federal courts and in New Hampshire, is no longer grounded upon
mechanical requirements of mutuality.”130 Therefore, the court noted that
“the res judicata defense is unmistakably available to them” because they
were “acting as agents of the insurers when they committed the putative
misdeeds for which they have now been sued . . . .”131 Because there was a
finding of fact in the prior suit exonerating the investigator and laboratory,
the First Circuit acknowledged that, “[i]n our view, this case is governed by
well-settled principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”132 The court
further explained in a footnote:
We recognize that there is a distinction between res judicata (claim
preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). We are also
cognizant that, at least as to some of Fiumara’s claims and as to certain of
the appellees, the latter doctrine may be the more apposite. Yet, the
splitting of such fine hairs would be meaningless in this case, as these two
lines of defense share a distinct family resemblance; under the New
Hampshire cases, collateral estoppel is viewed merely as “an extension of
the doctrine of res judicata.” Thus, to facilitate our analysis of the
questions before us, we will use a shorthand reference to the term “res
judicata” to embrace both, without making any pretense of being more
precise than the exigencies of the matter at bar warrant.133

New Mexico: New Mexico law adopts Section 51 of the Second
Restatement of Judgments.134 In Gonzales v. Hernandez,135 plaintiff
brought an unsuccessful civil rights claim in New Mexico state court
against a hospital alleging that the hospital, through its employees,
discriminated against her while she was employed there and was thereby
vicariously liable.136 The jury returned a verdict finding the hospital did
not discriminate against her.137 In her subsequent federal court action, the
Tenth Circuit held: “[P]ursuant to [Restatement (Second) of Judgments]
129. Id. at 90.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 92.
132. Id. at 90.
133. Id. at 90 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting Bricker v. Crane, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (N.H.
1978)).
134. Gonzales v. Hernandez, 175 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 1999) (“In the instant case,
New Mexico law adopting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51 (1980) controls
questions of preclusion involving vicarious liability.”).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1204.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/1

26

Koppel: The Case for Nonmutual Privity in Vicarious Liability Relationshi

2017] NONMUTUAL PRIVITY IN VICARIOUS LIABILITY RELATIONSHIPS

27

section 51(1) as applied in New Mexico, the district court correctly held
that Ms. Gonzales is precluded from litigating claims against the defendant
[hospital] employees . . . . ”138
New York: Citing Section 51(3) of the Second Restatement of
Judgments, the federal district court held in Garver v. Brown & Co.
Securities Corp.,139 that the previous judgment and division of property in a
divorce proceeding between plaintiff and her ex-husband, precluded
plaintiff’s subsequent claim against her ex-husband’s securities broker
based on the ex-husband’s alleged unauthorized transfer of funds out of
plaintiff’s brokerage account.140 In observing that “courts applying New
York’s res judicata rules have found that ‘privity’ exists between parties in
an indemnification relationship,”141 the court applied the same rationale for
this privity relationship underlying the narrow exception to mutuality of
estoppel:
If [the ex-wife] were to prevail on these claims, [the broker] would have a
right to seek indemnification from [the ex-husband]. . . . Allowing [the
broker] to exercise its right of indemnification, however, would
impermissibly upset the state court’s final judgment as to the appropriate
allocation of property between the plaintiff and [her ex-husband]. On the
other hand, denying [the broker’s] right of indemnification would destroy
this right even though [the broker], unlike the plaintiff, did not have the
opportunity to present its case to the state court. New York’s res judicata
rules do not permit the plaintiff to use this Court as a forum in which to
create such impossible choices and anomalous consequences.142

138. Id. at 1206; see also Ford v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 891 P.2d 546, 555 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1994) (citing Section 51 and applying claim preclusion in favor of defendant state
agency in a state action based on a verdict in favor of the agency’s employees in prior
federal court suit, where “the same operative facts form[ed] the basis of both [p]laintiff’s
state court complaint and his federal amended complaint. The allegations in the state
complaint [were] almost identical to those in the federal complaint.”).
139. Garver v. Brown & Co. Sec. Corp., No. 96 Civ. 2507 (JGK), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1454 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1998).
140. Id. at *19–20.
141. Id. at *15–16 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at *19–20; see also Bloom v. ProMaxima Mfg. Co., 743 F. Supp. 2d 219
(W.D.N.Y. 2010). In a suit against a manufacturer of exercise equipment and the
distributor, distributor settled with the plaintiff and the jury found for the manufacturer,
which then moved to dismiss distributor’s indemnity cross-claim against it with prejudice,
thereby effectively precluding the distributor’s assertion of that claim in another court. Id.
at 221. Applying Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51, the court granted the
manufacturer’s motion, finding that permitting the distributor the opportunity to be
indemnified by the manufacturer on the distributor’s cross-claim, after the manufacturer had
received a favorable judgment of no liability to the injured purchaser, would create the risk
of an anomalous situation by having the indemnitor-manufacturer indemnify the
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North Dakota: The Supreme Court of North Dakota, applying the
equivalent of the broad exception in Lucas v. Porter,143 involving a
principal-agent relationship, held that claim preclusion barred claims
against the agent based on the judgment in a prior suit in favor of the
principal.144 Applying a privity analysis, the court noted: “This Court has
adopted an ‘expanded’ version of privity for claim preclusion. ‘[P]rivity
exits if a person is so identified in interest with another that he represents
the same legal right.’”145 The court also noted that “[f]undamental fairness
underlies the determination of privity.”146 The court held:
[The plaintiff’s] claims against [the agents] in this action arose out of the
same underlying factual circumstances that established the existence of [the
plaintiff’s] rights in [the first suit] and are derivative of his claims against
the [principals] in [the first suit]. Under these circumstances, we conclude
there is a sufficient identity of common interests of the corporate
defendants in [the first suit] with the individual defendants in [the second
suit] for purposes of claim preclusion and splitting a cause of action. We
therefore conclude [the second suit] involves an action against the same
parties or their privies as in [the first suit] for purposes of splitting a cause
of action.147

Ohio: Ohio’s Ninth District Court of Appeals “determined that an
employee’s employment relationship, coupled with an identity of desired
result, created privity between the employee and his employer,”148 in
indemnitee-distributor after manufacturer was found not to be liable to the injured
purchaser. Id. at 224–25. The court reasoned that:
[T]he rules of res judicata applicable in this situation should approximate those
that govern when the same claim is successively asserted against a single
defendant. The effect of the rule of [Section 51] is that those rules are applicable,
with exceptions that take account of contingencies resulting from the fact that two
defendants are involved.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 cmt. b). See also Xu v. City of
New York, No. 08 Civ. 11339 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78404, at *8–18 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 2010) (purporting to apply New York preclusion law by applying issue preclusion to
preclude relitigation of issues determined in prior suit against city agency, applying claim
preclusion to preclude claims that should have been asserted in prior action, and holding that
the city agency’s employees sued in the second action were in privity with the city agency).
143. Lucas v. Porter, 755 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 2008).
144. Id. at 98–99.
145. Id. at 98 (quoting Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380,
384 (N.D. 1992)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 98–99.
148. Elec. Enlightenment, Inc. v. Kirsch, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23916, 2008-Ohio-3633,
at ¶ 9 (emphasis added) (citing Singfield v. Yuhasz, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22432, 2005Ohio-3636, at ¶ 11).
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concluding that an “employee who was acting within the scope of his
employment was in privity with his employer.”149
In Electrical
150
Enlightenment, Inc. v. Kirsch, plaintiff company brought action against a
competitor’s worker who had posted and maintained the competitor’s
website, alleging that the competitor’s website was impermissibly similar
to plaintiff-company’s own website.151 The Court of Appeals held that a
prior judgment against the competitor company precluded the plaintiff’s
claim against the competitor’s worker, finding the competitor’s worker to
be in privity with the competitor, his employer.152 Extending the privity
concept further, the court found that, even if the worker was an
independent contractor, “it is undisputed that [the worker] was hired by
[plaintiff’s competitor] and was performing work for [the competitor] when
he posted and maintained [the competitor’s] website.”153 Accordingly, the
court concluded “that [the worker and competitor’s] relationship [was]
‘close enough’ to permit the application of res judicata,”154 and that their
“work relationship, coupled with the identity of desired result, create[d]
privity among them.”155
Oklahoma: In Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG,156 plaintiffs, who
were severely burned in a car accident while traveling in their Audi 100
LS, initially brought a products liability suit against Audi NSU, the
manufacturer.157 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Audi NSU.158
Subsequently, plaintiffs sued Volkswagen AG alleging it “had a controlling
relationship with Audi NSU and is therefore responsible for the torts of its
subsidiary.”159 The court determined that the jury’s verdict in favor of
Audi NSU “necessarily means”160 that the jury “actually decided”161 at least
one of three facts—(1) that Audi 100 LS fuel tank was not defective, (2)
that the alleged defect did not make the product unreasonably dangerous, or

149. Elec. Enlightenment, 2008-Ohio-3633 at ¶ 9 (citing Doolittle v. Zapis Commc’n
Corp., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 99-T-0084, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3781, at *5 (Aug. 18,
2000)).
150. Elec. Enlightenment, 2008-Ohio-3633 at *1.
151. Id.
152. Id. at ¶ 11.
153. Id. at ¶ 10.
154. Id.
155. Id. at ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
156. Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 56 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1995).
157. Id. at 1271.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1275.
160. Id. at 1273.
161. Id.
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(3) that the alleged defect did not cause plaintiffs’ injuries—and that any
one of these facts were “necessary to support the judgment.”162 The Court
of Appeals concluded that the district court properly dismissed the products
liability claim against Volkswagen AG, the parent corporation, under the
doctrine of claim preclusion, not issue preclusion.163 Citing Section 51 of
the Second Restatement of Judgments, the court stated that if Volkswagen
AG had a controlling, “near alter ego”164 relationship with Audi NSU
which made Volkswagen AG responsible for the torts of its subsidiary, that
relationship “would be sufficient to establish ‘privity’ between the two
corporations such that Volkswagen AG is entitled to assert the previous
judgment as a bar to the claim now asserted.”165
Pennsylvania: In Michelson v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.,166
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, citing
Pennsylvania law and Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments,
held that plaintiff’s defamation claim in a suit against Exxon was precluded
by res judicata based on a judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered
against plaintiff in a previous Pennsylvania state court suit against an
Exxon employee, Kelly.167 In the state action, plaintiff alleged that Kelly
sent a defamatory memo to plaintiff’s supervisor at Exxon, Arthur
Hanggeli, who, in turn, passed the memo on to his own supervisor.168
Hanggeli was not a defendant in the state action. Based on this state court
judgment, the Third Circuit held: “Because Pennsylvania courts have
rejected the notion of mutuality of estoppel, [plaintiff] is collaterally
estopped from pursuing his claim based on Hanggeli’s republication” of the
allegedly defamatory memo.169 Thus, because plaintiff did not previously
assert a defamation claim against Hanggeli, who was not a defendant in the
state court suit, Exxon’s alleged vicarious liability for Hanggeli’s conduct
could not have been barred by claim preclusion.170
Rhode Island: The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in deciding whether
a stipulated dismissal with prejudice of a product liability claim against the
manufacturer of a surgically implanted prosthesis, Dacomed, precluded a
claim by the same plaintiff against the parent company of the manufacturer,
Urohealth, ruled as a matter of Rhode Island law that “[a] privity
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
Robinson, 56 F.3d at 1275 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1006.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
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determination does not rise or fall on the distinction between direct and
vicarious liability. Under Rhode Island law, privity is defined by a
commonality of interests.”171 The court held that a sufficient commonality
of interest existed for purposes of res judicata because “[t]he parent
[Urohealth] and subsidiary [Dacomed] are in privity because Urohealth
always has taken legal responsibility for the product and Dacomed’s
actions and stands ready to defend Dacomed in the state case.”172
South Carolina: In E.A. Prince & Son, Inc. v. Selective Insurance
Co.,173 the federal district court, applying South Carolina law, noted: “Res
judicata bars a subsequent suit if the parties are the same or their
privies,”174 and that a “judgment on the merits in favor of the agent is a bar
to an action against the principal for the same cause, because the principal’s
liability is predicated upon that of the agent. But a judgment against the
agent is not conclusive in an action against the principal.”175
Tennessee: The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Creech v.
Addington,176 held that claim preclusion barred a vicarious liability claim
for fraudulent misrepresentations, brought against defendants by investors
in property owned by the defendants, based on a prior judgment on the
merits dismissing a claim by the same investors against the defendants’ real
estate agents arising out of the same failed investment transaction.177 The
court framed the vicarious liability relationship between the property
owners and their real estate agents in terms of privity.178 The court stated:
“The doctrine of res judicata, also referred to as claim preclusion, bars a
second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of
action with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated in
the former suit.”179 The court then concluded: “The ‘same parties or their
privies’ requirement for application of res judicata is met here.”180
Although the court held that claim preclusion barred suit against the

171. Lennon v. Dacomed Corp., 901 A.2d 582, 591 (R.I. 2006) (citing Duffy v. Milder,
896 A.2d 27, 36 (R.I. 2006)).
172. Id. at 592 (emphasis added) (quoting Doe v. Urohealth Sys., Inc., 216 F.3d 157, 162
(1st Cir. 2000)).
173. E.A. Prince & Son, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 910 (D.S.C. 1993).
174. Id. at 915 (emphasis added) (citing Branning v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co., 739 F. Supp.
1056, 1064–65 (D.S.C. 1990)).
175. Id. (quoting Rookard v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry. Co., 65 S.E. 1047, 1047
(S.C. 1909)).
176. Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363 (Tenn. 2009).
177. Id. at 383.
178. Id. at 373.
179. Id. at 376 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 376–77.
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principal, it declined to apply issue preclusion because the trial court in the
initial suit against the agents did not make a finding on the same issue
raised in the suit against the principal.181
Texas: In Soto v. Phillips,182 the Texas Court of Appeals, applying the
equivalent of the broad exception and citing Section 51 of the Second
Restatement of Judgments, ruled:
When the allegation is that the parties were in a vicarious relationship, . . . a
judgment for the principal bars a later suit against the agent. The converse
is also true. Res judicata is available to a principal whose liability rests on
derivative or vicarious responsibility for an actor’s conduct which was
necessarily decided adversely to the claimant in an earlier suit against the
actor.183

The court held that physicians, Dr. Phillips and Dr. Butler, could
assert res judicata as a defense in a subsequent action brought by an injured
employee against the physicians based on their alleged false testimony in a
workers’ compensation case. The physicians had acted as agents for the
workers’ compensation carrier and the employer when they examined the
181. Id. at 374.
182. Soto v. Phillips, 836 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
183. Id. at 270 (citations omitted). In another case, U.S. ex rel. Paul v. Parsons,
Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1994), the court, citing
“Texas law which holds that ‘where the rights and liabilities of a party are derivative, a
judgment binding a party from whom the rights or liabilities are derived may be set up as a
bar in the second suit,’” as well as the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51(1), found
that a derivative relationship existed between two joint venture subcontractors that amounts
to privity and a derivative relationship between a general contractor and its subcontractor.
Id. at 373 (quoting Lemon v. Spann, 633 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)). The court
held that the judgment against plaintiff after a jury trial in his previous suit against one of
the joint venturers precluded assertion of the same claim against the other joint venturer and
the general contractor where judgment against the plaintiff in the first suit was based on a
jury verdict and “the alleged filing of false or fraudulent claims, the operative facts are the
same as those in the prior lawsuit.” Id. at 374. Therefore, issue preclusion presumably
would have been available. In Truck Insurance Exchange v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., a
suit against Mid-Continent Casualty Company where Truck Insurance Exchange (“Truck”)
sought “reimbursement for settlement and defense costs that Truck paid to defend the
parties’ mutual insured,” 320 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010), the court held that
Truck and the insured were in privity “[b]ecause all Truck’s claims against Mid-Continent
derive entirely from [the insured] and, as a result depend upon [the insured’s] right to
coverage under its policy with Mid-Continent [and therefore] Truck’s interest in the policy
is the same as [the insured’s].” Id. at 619. Although the court framed the issue in terms of
claim preclusion, there is some question as to whether this holding deals instead with issue
preclusion (i.e., whether Truck is bound by the “no coverage” finding in the prior suit). Id.
at 620. The court added, “[b]ecause we hold that Truck is in privity with [the insured] as to
the federal coverage decision, Truck is precluded from relitigating the issues [of no
coverage] decided by that decision.” Id.
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injured employee prior to the workers’ compensation case and were
therefore in privity with carrier and employer, who were defendants in the
workers’ compensation case.184
Washington: In Kuhlman v. Thomas,185 a former employee of the state
housing authority (“SHA”) sued the SHA, claiming that its employees
violated plaintiff’s state due process rights in disciplinary proceedings.186
The trial court granted summary judgment in the SHA’s favor, “finding
that SHA had not deprived Kuhlman of his right to due process.”187 In
Kuhlman’s subsequent suit against the SHA’s employees, asserting the
same state due process claim, the Washington Court of Appeals held that
Kuhlman’s claim was precluded by the prior summary judgment in the
employer’s favor.188 It appears that the court applied the equivalent of the
broad exception, allowing SHA’s employees to enjoy the preclusion
benefits of their employer’s previous judgment. It is noteworthy that the
court applied the doctrine of res judicata, rather than collateral estoppel, to
preclude the entire claim.189 The court did not merely apply the doctrine to
preclude relitigation of the due process rights violation issue determined in
the prior action. It is also significant that the court found the housing
authority and the defendant employees were “in privity,” noting: “[A]
number of federal circuits have concluded that, in general, the
employer/employee relationship is sufficient to establish privity.”190
Fourteen years later, the Washington Court of Appeals, citing
Kuhlman and Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments, once
again ruled, in Ensley v. Pitcher,191 that “[t]he employer/employee
184. Soto, 836 S.W.2d at 269–70.
185. Kuhlman v. Thomas, 897 P.2d 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
186. Id. at 366–67.
187. Id. at 367.
188. Id. at 370.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 368 (emphasis added). The court stated:
SHA’s [the State Housing Authority’s] liability in the first complaint [the first
case] was premised entirely on the actions of its employees. In particular,
Kuhlman specifically complained that the employees’ accusations were false and
that, as a consequence, SHA officials had wrongfully suspended and demoted
him. The suit against SHA was therefore essentially a suit against its employees.
That is to say, whether SHA violated Kuhlman’s rights turned on the propriety of
its employees conduct. Having defended that suit, SHA essentially acted as their
representative, protecting their interests in the first suit.
Under these
circumstances, the parties must therefore be viewed as sufficiently the same, if not
identical.
Id. at 368–69 (citations omitted).
191. Ensley v. Pitcher, 222 P.3d 99 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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relationship is sufficient to establish privity.”192 In Ensley, plaintiff’s
negligence claim against a bartender, who allegedly over-served drinks to a
driver who injured plaintiff when the driver crashed into plaintiff’s car, was
precluded by res judicata based on the summary judgment dismissal of
plaintiff’s identical negligence claim against the bar itself; finding privity
between the bartender and the bar based on their vicarious liability
relationship.193 And, once again, the court applied the “more lenient”
concept of res judicata over collateral estoppel,194 notwithstanding that the
prior summary judgment in favor of the bar had determined the issue of the
bartender’s non-negligence.195
West Virginia: In Shafi v. St. Francis Hospital,196 the Fourth Circuit
held that plaintiff’s state-law tortious interference claim against the
Hospital and Wright, its president, was barred by claim preclusion.197 The
court reasoned that the plaintiff could have asserted the claim in his prior
state court suit against the Hospital: “All of Wright’s allegedly tortious
actions were taken in his capacity as president of [the Hospital], as indeed
all ‘actions’ of [the Hospital] were actually performed by Wright. Hence,
Wright is in privity with [the Hospital] so as to share its res judicata
defense.”198

192. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 104. The court explained:
Different defendants in separate suits are the same party for res judicata
purposes as long as they are in privity. [citing Kuhlman, 897 P.2d at 368]. The
employer/employee relationship is sufficient to establish privity. [Id.] (holding
that where the ultimate issue of whether the employer had violated the plaintiff’s
rights turned on the propriety of its employees conduct, the parties must be viewed
as sufficiently the same, “if not identical”); see also Kuhlman’s discussion of
federal law therein. Pitcher and Red Onion are clearly in privity. Ensley could
have sought to establish Pitcher’s personal liability in the first suit. The fact that
Ensley did not name Pitcher as a defendant does not defeat the identity of the
parties where the employer’s liability turns solely on vicarious liability.
Id.
194. Id. at 102 (observing a difference in “collateral estoppel’s requirement that the issue
be actually litigated from res judicata’s more lenient standard where issues that could have
been litigated and resolved are barred.” (citing 14A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON
PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 35.33, at 479 (1st ed. 2007))).
195. Id. at 100–01.
196. Shafi v. St. Francis Hosp., Nos. 90-3107, 90-3117, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15232,
937 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision).
197. Id. at *13–14.
198. Id. at *13–14 (first emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 51 (AM. LAW INST. (1982)).
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Wisconsin: In Landess v. Schmidt,199 plaintiff operated a milk hauling
business.200 Plaintiff collected and delivered milk from a number of dairy
farms and delivered it to Borden’s West Allis dairy (“the diary”).201 After
the dairy stopped accepting milk from Landess and arranged for different
haulers (“the haulers”) to collect and deliver the milk, Landess sued the
dairy for tortious interference with his business relations and breach of
implied contract.202 The court granted the dairy’s summary judgment
motion and dismissed the claims.203 Landess subsequently sued the dairy,
three of its employees, and the haulers, alleging conspiracy to injure his
reputation and business.204 The dairy and the employees moved for
summary judgment asserting that res judicata precluded the claims against
them.205 The haulers, who were not employees of the dairy, moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that Landess was “collaterally
estopped” from bringing the action by the judgment in the federal court
suit.206 The trial court granted both motions.207 On appeal, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals affirmed both summary judgment motions.208 Citing
Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments, the court held: “Since
Landess claims that the employees are Borden’s ‘employees,’ Borden is
vicariously responsible for the conduct of those employees.”209 Therefore,
“the prior judgment against Borden extinguishe[d] the conspiracy claim
against the employees.”210 The court applied an equivalent of the broad
exception because the employer was previously sued. The court applied
the exception on the basis of res judicata rather than collateral estoppel.211
199. Landess v. Schmidt, 340 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
200. Id. at 215.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 218.
210. Id.
211. Id. In Tyler v. Danielson, the court held that Wisconsin law requires, inter alia, the
“identity between the parties or their privies in the prior and present suits.” Civil No.
06-2392 (PAM/RLE), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77482, at *10 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2006)
(emphasis added) (quoting Kruckenburg v. Harvey, 694 N.W.2d 879, 885 (Wis. 2005)).
Regarding whether the Bank employees Craig and Erwin Danielson were in privity with the
Bank, the court stated:
The [c]omplaint . . . alleges that Craig and Erwin Danielson injured him through
their actions as bank officials. “A prior judgment against an employer bars a
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Federal Caselaw Among the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits

At the outset, it is worth noting that, when addressing nonmutual
claim preclusion in vicarious liability relationships for the first time, two
federal circuits—the Fifth in Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp.,212 and the
Eleventh in Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corp.213—observed:
“Most other federal circuits have concluded that employer-employee or
principal-agent relationships may ground a claim preclusion defense,
regardless which party to the relationship was first sued.”214
First Circuit: The First Circuit recognizes “nonmutual claim
preclusion” where there is a “close and significant relationship” between
the new defendants and the original defendants.215 Derivative or vicarious
liability relationships were held to constitute a close and significant
relationship in two federal district court cases, but neither decision cited the
Second Restatement of Judgments’ Section 51 nor were the relationships
framed in terms of privity.216
In Andrews-Clarke v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.,217 the federal district
court held res judicata barred a suit by an insured under an employee health
plan against the insured’s employer based on a prior judgment dismissing
the insured’s claim against the health plan insurers on grounds that the
claims were preempted by ERISA.218 Citing the complaint, which alleged,
“under [the] doctrine of respondeat superior, [the employer is] vicariously
liable for wrongful conduct of [the health insurers],”219 the court found that
a close and significant relationship between the employer and the health
subsequent suit against its employees.” Because Plaintiff is suing Craig and
Erwin Danielson for actions they took as agents of RiverBank, the first element is
satisfied.
Id. at *10–11 (citations omitted) (quoting Lindas v. Cady, 499 N.W.2d 692, 298 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993)).
212. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1989).
213. Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1990).
214. Lubrizol Corp., 871 F.2d at 1288; Citibank, N.A., 904 F.2d at 1502 (quoting
Lubrizol Corp., 871 F.2d at 1288).
215. In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing with approval a
formulation where nonmutual claim preclusion is appropriate “only if the new party can
show good reasons why he should have been joined in the first action and the old party
cannot show any good reasons to justify a second chance.” (quoting WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 9, § 4464, at 589 (1st ed. 1981))).
216. See Andrews-Clarke v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. Mass. 2001);
see also Silva v. City of New Bedford, 677 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Mass. 2009).
217. Andrews-Clarke, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
218. Id. at 103.
219. Id. at 101.
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plan insurers existed, stating that the “[employer’s] liability (if any), is
dependent upon a finding of wrongdoing by [the health plan insurers].”220
In Silva v. City of New Bedford,221 the court found a relationship
between a city and its police officers to be close and significant enough to
justify nonmutual claim preclusion of derivative liability claims against the
city.222 Preclusion was based on the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s
claim against the officers pursuant to an offer of judgment.223 The court
reasoned, “Silva seeks to predicate liability solely on the officers’ actions
and, in doing so, aligns this case with the previous one under a form of
derivative liability.”224
Although both Silva and Andrews-Clarke involved the same narrow
exception because the primary obligor was sued first, the Silva court cited
language in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease
Financial Corp.: “Most other federal circuits have concluded that
employer-employee or principal-agent relationships may ground a claim
preclusion defense, regardless [of] which party to the relationship was first
sued.”225
Second Circuit: Three Second Circuit decisions applied nonmutual
claim preclusion finding that parties to a vicarious liability relationship
were in privity.226 Two of these decisions, Falbaum v. Pomerantz227 and
Krepps v. Reiner,228 expressly cited the Second Restatement of Judgments’
Section 51 in applying the equivalent of the broad exception.
In Falbaum, the court precluded an employee’s claim against a
company’s officers and directors on grounds of res judicata based on the
court’s finding that the company, previously and unsuccessfully sued by
the former employee on an age discrimination claim, was in privity with
the company’s officers and members of the Board.229

220. Id.
221. Silva, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
222. Id. at 370.
223. Id. at 369.
224. Id. at 372.
225. Id. at 370 (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1502
(11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added)).
226. See Krepps v. Reiner, 377 F. App’x 65 (2d Cir. 2010); John St. Leasehold, LLC v.
Capital Mgmt. Res., L.P., 283 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2002); Falbaum v. Pomerantz, 19 F. App’x
10 (2d Cir. 2001).
227. Falbaum, 19 F. App’x at 10.
228. Krepps, 377 F. App’x at 65.
229. Falbaum, 19 F. App’x at 14 (“Because we find that Defendants are in privity with
[plaintiffs’ former employer], Plaintiffs are barred from bringing a disparate impact claim
because they could have timely raised such a claim during the bankruptcy proceeding.”).
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Similarly, in Krepps, the court held a vicarious liability relationship
between employer and employee “support[ed] a determination of privity
for the purpose of claim preclusion.”230 Based on this privity relationship,
the court held that claim preclusion barred plaintiff’s fraud claim against
Reiner, an employee of plaintiff’s business competitor, Cognitive Arts,
based on dismissal of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against Cognitive
Arts arising from the same transaction.231 The court held:
[I]t is undisputed that [Reiner] was an employee acting within the scope of
his employment in connection with the matter here at issue. Thus,
Cognitive Arts clearly had a relationship of vicarious liability with Reiner
supporting a determination of privity for the purpose of claim preclusion.
In such circumstances, . . . “[a] judgment against the injured person that
bars him from reasserting his claim against the defendant in the first action
extinguishes any claim he has against the other person responsible for his
conduct.”232

However, in both decisions, the respective appellate courts first
considered and rejected the application of issue preclusion before relying
on claim preclusion.233
In a third appellate decision, John Street Leasehold, LLC v. Capital
Management Resources, L.P.,234 the court found privity between principal
and agent and, though not citing Section 51 of the Restatement, applied the
equivalent of the broad exception.235 John Street Leasehold (“JSL”)
secured a mortgage-secured loan from a bank that eventually went into
receivership with the FDIC, which appointed Capital Management
Resources (“CMR”) to manage the failed bank’s assets.236 When CMR
foreclosed on JSL’s property, JSL sued the FDIC, in its capacity as

230. Krepps, 377 F. App’x at 68 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 &
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
231. Id. at 68.
232. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
233. Compare Falbaum, 19 F. App’x at 13 (“Issue preclusion, however, cannot bar
Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims because the disparate impact issue was not litigated
before the Bankruptcy Court and was therefore unnecessary to its judgment.”), with Krepps,
377 F. App’x at 67 (“[E]ven if we were to conclude that fraud had not been litigated in the
EA action, we would identify no error warranting remand because this action would still be
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, which “‘extinguish[es] . . . all rights of the
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction,
or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.’” (quoting Duane Reade,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2010))).
234. John St. Leasehold, LLC v. Capital Mgmt. Res. L.P., 283 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2002).
235. Id. at 74.
236. Id.
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receiver, for “breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”237 After the
trial court granted summary judgment for the FDIC, JSL sued FDIC
employees as well as CMR asserting additional claims arising from the
foreclosure.238 Affirming the district court’s dismissal of JSL’s claims on
res judicata grounds, the Second Circuit stated:
The District Court correctly concluded that John Street’s claims against
FDIC employees and against non-FDIC defendants were barred by
principles of res judicata because those persons were in privity with the
defendants in the prior action. We agree with the District Court that John
Street’s argument that the conduct of FDIC employees and non-FDIC
defendants [CMR] was outside the scope of their agency is frivolous and
that there is no evidence that either FDIC employees or non-FDIC
defendants acted outside the scope of their agency.239

Two decisions out of the Southern District of New York—Soto v. U.S.
Lines, Inc.240 and Mathews v. New York Racing Ass’n241—are consistent
with the foregoing Second Circuit decisions applying nonmutual claim
preclusion in vicarious liability relationships.
In Soto, the
indemnitor-indemnitee relationship involved a ship owner-indemnitee, who
under general maritime law could be held vicariously liable to a seaman
injured aboard ship for the seaman’s negligent treatment by the
hospital-indemnitor.242 The district court concluded that settlement of the
seaman’s medical malpractice suit against the hospital precluded a
subsequent vicarious liability claim against the ship owner.243 The court
held:
General principles of res judicata hold that a judgment entered in an action
against an indemnitor, such as the hospital, precludes a later action against
an indemnitee, such as defendant, to the same extent as it precludes a
second action against the indemnitor. . . . Therefore defendant need not
worry about vicarious liability in this action, insofar as negligence of the

237. Id.
238. Id. at 74–75.
239. Id. at 75 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
240. Soto v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
241. Mathews v. New York Racing Ass’n, 193 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
242. Soto, 608 F. Supp. at 906 (“Defendant claims, correctly, that under general
maritime law it could be held vicariously liable to plaintiffs—that is, liable without a finding
of negligence on its part—for [the hospital’s] negligence . . . . A finding of agency would
also impose vicarious liability to plaintiffs, but by way of the Jones Act. If defendant were
to be found liable on either of these theories, it would ordinarily be entitled to indemnity
from [the hospital].” (citations omitted)).
243. Id.
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[hospital] is concerned. Res judicata bars any recovery premised upon [the
hospital’s] . . . negligence.244

In Mathews, a bench trial exonerating a racetrack’s employees
precluded plaintiff’s claims against defendant operator of Jamaica Race
Track for false arrest at the racetrack and for malicious prosecution for
disorderly conduct.245 The court held: “Clearly, any liability of the
defendants for the acts or statements of their agents must be predicated
upon the familiar principle of respondeat superior.”246 The court appears to
have made its decision on grounds of claim preclusion rather than issue
preclusion, despite the court’s finding that “[e]ssentially . . . the same facts
are the basis for liability in each suit,”247 and despite the fact that the
previous bench trial weighed those facts in favor of the race track’s
employees.248
A third Southern District of New York decision deserves mention
even though the court’s opinion does not explicitly refer to vicarious
liability relationships.249 In a suit by an investment company against a
former employee alleging securities fraud arising from a series of securities
transactions, the court permitted the employee to invoke claim preclusion
based on a prior suit by the investment company against the company’s
employee fidelity bond insurance carrier, in which judgment was entered
against the company. In Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian,250 the court
observed: “In order to invoke claim preclusion, mutuality is no longer
required if the nonparty is in privity with a party to the initial action,” and
then found that the insurance carrier and the former employee were in
privity on the grounds that their relationship was “sufficiently close” to
warrant preclusion.251 Reasoning that “liability was placed at issue in [the
former action against the insurance carrier] ‘so as to have interested the
carrier in obtaining a favorable outcome there,’”252 the court held: “[T]he
economic interests of [the former employee] and [the insurance carrier]
were sufficient to yield a finding of privity.”253 Although the court did not
244. Id. (citations omitted).
245. Mathews, 193 F. Supp. at 296.
246. Id. at 295.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 294.
249. See Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 677 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 715 (citations omitted). This statement reflects some doctrinal confusion
since privity between a nonparty and a party would appear to satisfy mutuality.
252. Id. (quoting Tolley v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 638 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
253. Hagopian, 677 F. Supp. at 715.
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expressly find a derivative liability relationship between the insurance
carrier and the employee, presumably the employee would have been
obligated to indemnify the insurer had the insurer been held liable to the
employer on the fidelity bond.254 It should be noted that, while the court
applied claim preclusion as to those claims related to additional securities
transactions that were not litigated in the prior action against the insurer, it
applied issue preclusion—rather than claim preclusion—to claims related
to the same securities transactions that were at issue in the previous suit.255
Third Circuit: In accord with the First Circuit, Third Circuit caselaw
recognizes that the concept of privity, traditionally “limited to a set of
substantive legal relationships,”256 has been “pragmatically expanded”257 to
apply claim preclusion “whenever ‘there is a close or significant
relationship between successive defendants.’”258 A vicarious liability
relationship between employer and employee acting within the scope of his
employment is one of those close or significant relationships resulting in
the conclusion that they are in privity for purposes of claim preclusion.259
254. See generally id. But see 13 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 559, § 22, at 607 (1991)
(“Once the insurer pays to the insured employer the amount of a loss caused by the fraud or
dishonesty of an employee covered by a fidelity bond, the insured is subrogated pro tanto to
any right of action that the employer may have against the employee or against any third
party who benefited from the employee’s act. As discussed in an earlier section, the insurer
may also have an independent claim for indemnification against the covered employee if the
court interprets the fidelity bond as a contract of suretyship.” (footnotes omitted)).
255. Hagopian, 677 F. Supp. at 717.
256. Jackson v. Dow Chem. Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 658, 670 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 52 (1982); 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 9, § 4448, at 326–27).
257. Jackson, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
258. Id. (quoting Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir.1991)).
259. Jackson, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 671. In Jackson, the Third Circuit held:
The first three [defendants named in plaintiff’s second suit] are alleged to be
employees of Rohm and Haas [defendant in prior suit] and are sued for actions
arising out of their employment. The second two are alleged to be employees of
Liberty Mutual [defendant in prior suit] and are also sued for actions arising out of
their employment.
Based on the Complaint, these employees have the sort of close and
significant relationship with their employers that has been found to justify
preclusion in other cases. Thus, the newly named employees can benefit from the
preclusive effect of the judgment entered in favor of their employers in the prior
suit.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). In another case, while citing Section 51 of the
Second, a Pennsylvania district court held that prior settlement of the plaintiffs’ action
against a brokerage firm precluded the plaintiffs’ suit against the firm’s employees:
We agree with ML Defendants that Brubacher is in privity with Merrill
Lynch. The doctrine of res judicata applies to parties where one is vicariously
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Fourth Circuit: In a suit between an insured and an agent of the
insurance company, the Fourth Circuit, in Adkins v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,260 upheld the agent’s claim preclusion defense based on the judgment
in a previous action against the insurance company, simply stating in a
footnote: “As the district court noted, plaintiff’s claim against Simmons
implicates only actions taken by him within the scope of his employment as
an Allstate agent. His status as defendant therefore in no way relieves
plaintiff of the constraints of the doctrine of res judicata.”261
Fifth Circuit: In Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp.,262 the Fifth Circuit for
the first time addressed “claim preclusion in a case where the parties who
seek its benefit are related by vicarious liability to the defendant in the prior
lawsuit.”263 Commenting that “[m]ost other federal circuits have concluded
that employer-employee or principal-agent relationships may ground a
claim preclusion defense, regardless which party to the relationship was
first sued,”264 the Fifth Circuit held that two Exxon employees could
benefit from claim preclusion based on a settlement agreement and
judgment of dismissal in plaintiff’s earlier suit against Exxon.265 Although
the opinion did not cite Section 51 of the Second Restatement of
Judgments, its application of nonmutual claim preclusion where the
employer-indemnitee was sued first is consistent with Section 51 and the
broad exception to mutuality. However, the opinion implies that, had the
grounds for issue preclusion existed, the court would have rested its
preclusion determination on that ground rather than claim preclusion.266
responsible for the other, such as in an employer-employee relationship.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint . . . contains no allegations that Brubacher
was acting outside the scope of her employment such that Merrill Lynch would
not be vicariously liable.
Metcalf v. Merrill Lynch, 895 F. Supp. 2d 645, 657 (M.D. Penn. 2012), vacated, 587 F.
App’x 719, 726 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that regardless of whether res judicata applied,
defendant Merrill Lynch waived the defense, because “under New Mexico law, a defendant
cannot engage in extensive, split litigation without objection, and still preserve its res
judicata defense.”).
260. Adkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1984).
261. Id. at 975 n.1.
262. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1989).
263. Id. at 1288.
264. Id.
265. Id. (“Exxon breached the New Jersey protective order, provoking the computer
dispute, only because Evans and Lower—as Exxon employees acting in the scope of their
duties—engaged in the exact conduct of which Lubrizol now complains.”).
266. See id. at 1287 (“This determination rests upon ‘claim preclusion’ or true ‘res
judicata,’ rather than ‘issue preclusion’, once generally referred to as ‘collateral estoppel.’
Issue preclusion does not apply because the computer dispute was not fully litigated in the
trial court.”).
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The court in Lubrizol declined to take a position on the underlying
doctrinal justification for nonmutual claim preclusion, noting that “[t]he
doctrinal basis for these decisions has varied according to their fidelity to
traditional mutuality or privity concepts . . . .”267 Acknowledging the
divergent viewpoints on the doctrinal justification for nonmutual claim
preclusion, the court further stated:
[W]e make no broad pronouncements about the doctrines of mutuality or
privity in this circuit. It is enough for present purposes to decide that,
whether considered an “exception” to mutuality, or an “extension” of
privity, the vicarious liability relationship between Exxon and its
employees Evans and Lower, which forms the only asserted basis for
Exxon’s liability for the computer dispute, justifies claim preclusion.268

Section II.C addresses this doctrinal split and makes the case for
extending privity to include the parties to a vicarious liability relationship
in the context of nonmutual claim preclusion.
Three years after Lubrizol, the Fifth Circuit confronted nonmutual
claim preclusion in the context of the derivative liability relationship
between a corporation and its successor. In Russell v. SunAmerica
Securities,269 investors, whose money had allegedly been converted by a
broker-dealer (Southmark), sued Southmark, asserting various securities
fraud claims.270 After settling with Southmark, the investors brought a
securities
action
against
Southmark’s
successor
corporation,
SunAmerica.271 While noting that “[u]nfortunately, we have little guidance
as to whether a corporation and its successor are sufficiently related for
preclusion purposes,”272 the court concluded that “the derivative liability in
an employer-employee relationship is analogous to that of a corporation
and its successor under certain circumstances.”273 Seeking “guidance from
other circuits in another field of derivative liability: vicarious liability in the
employment context,”274 the court consulted decisions out of United States
Courts of Appeal for the First,275 Seventh,276 Ninth,277 Eleventh278 and D.C.
267. Id. at 1288.
268. Id. at 1289 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
269. Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., 962 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1992).
270. Id. at 1171.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1174.
273. Id. at 1175.
274. Id. at 1174.
275. Fiumara v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 746 F.2d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1984).
276. Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1983); Lambert v. Conrad, 536
F.2d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1976).
277. Spector v. El Ranco, Inc., 263 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1959).
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Circuits279 as well as the Fifth in Lubrizol,280 along with Section 51 of the
Second Restatement of Judgments. The court concluded that these “cases
which find that a vicarious liability relationship justifies a finding of privity
are instructive here.”281 Issue preclusion was not a viable alternative basis
for the court’s ruling because the prior action had been settled, dismissed
with prejudice, and a consent judgment entered.
Seventh Circuit: In Lambert v. Conrad,282 the Seventh Circuit quoted
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Spector v. El Ranco283:
Where, as here, the relations between two parties are analogous to that of
principal and agent, the rule is that a judgment in favor of either, in an
action brought by a third party, rendered upon a ground equally applicable
to both, is to be accepted as conclusive against plaintiff’s right of action
against the other.284

Even though the Lambert court did not cite to the Second Restatement
of Judgments, the position it takes is consistent with Section 51 of the
Restatement. In Lambert, the plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against
Northern Illinois University alleging that he had been improperly denied a
pre-termination hearing before being discharged.285 Judge Julius Hoffman
dismissed the action on several grounds including failure to state a claim,
“indicat[ing] that plaintiff’s interest did not approach the threshold level of
a legitimate claim of entitlement which would give rise to a property
interest,”286 and “even if plaintiff’s interest could be considered a protected
one, the hearing provided to him was sufficient to satisfy due process
requirements.”287 In plaintiff’s second suit seeking injunctive relief against
the members of the University’s Board of Regents, the district court
dismissed the complaint on res judicata grounds.288 The appellate court
affirmed, holding “that the difference in the identity of the defendants in

278. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1502 (11th Cir. 1991); Citibank, N.A. v. Data
Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1502–04 (11th Cir. 1990).
279. Lober v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
280. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1289 (5th Cir. 1989).
281. Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., 962 F.2d 1169, 1175 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
282. Lambert v. Conrad, 536 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1976).
283. Spector v. El Ranco, 263 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1959).
284. Lambert, 536 F.2d. at 1186 (quoting Spector, 263 F.2d at 145).
285. Id. at 1184.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1184–85. It is unclear whether the court could have relied on issue preclusion
to conclusively bind plaintiff with Judge Hoffman’s finding that the hearing provided to the
plaintiff satisfied due process.
288. Id. at 1184.
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the present action from those in the prior action is insufficient reason to
prevent plaintiff from being bound.”289
Several years after Lambert, the Seventh Circuit considered the issue
of privity between the Village of Lombard and the Village mayor, manager,
and several trustees of the Village board.290 The Village’s former chief of
police first sued the Village in state court asserting a claim of wrongful
termination in violation of Illinois state law and state constitutional due
process, which was dismissed by judgment on the pleadings.291 In the
plaintiff’s subsequent federal court action against the Village mayor,
manager, and board trustees for wrongful termination, alleging violation of
his civil rights under federal law and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he
district court correctly concluded that the individual defendants in
Mandarino’s federal action are in privity with the Village of Lombard, the
defendant in his state court action.”292
Ninth Circuit: In Spector v. El Ranco,293 the Ninth Circuit appears to
have applied nonmutual claim preclusion in a typical employer-employee
relationship where a hotel guest, injured when she slipped on a walkway,
sued the hotel based on the alleged negligence of its employee.294 After an
initial verdict in favor of the hotel, the guest pursued her claim against the
employee.295 Analogizing the relationship between the hotel and its
employee to that of principal and agent, the court affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of the plaintiff’s action stating:
[The employee’s] dismissal would appear to present a purely moot
question. Where, as here, the relations between two parties are analogous
to that of principal and agent, the rule is that a judgment in favor of either,
289. Id. at 1186.
290. Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1983).
291. Id. at 847.
292. Id. at 850 (emphasis added); see also Tamari v. Bache & Co., 637 F. Supp. 1333,
1341 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[A] decision on the merits of an action against a principal is res
judicata to a subsequent action against the agent (which Bache Lebanon may or may not be)
if the prior action concerned a matter within the agency.” (citing Lambert, 536 F.2d at 1183
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 1980))). In Tamari, the
court held that res judicata did not bar the claim:
However, because the court cannot determine whether or not the arbitration
decision was based on a defense personal to Bache Delaware (the lack of agency
authority for Bache Lebanon’s actions), the arbitration decision and Tamari Case
No. 77 C 301 cannot bar this action under the doctrine of res judicata.
Id. at 1342.
293. Spector v. El Ranco, 263 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1959).
294. Id. at 144.
295. Id. at 145.
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in an action brought by a third party, rendered upon a ground equally
applicable to both, is to be accepted as conclusive against the plaintiff’s
right of action against the other. Since there was a verdict and judgment in
favor of the Hotel as Graham’s principal, Graham was entitled to raise this
judgment as a bar to appellant’s action as against him.296

It is not clear whether the court was applying claim or issue
preclusion. While the judgment was based on a verdict in the hotel’s favor,
so that issue preclusion presumably would have been applicable, the court
does not specify the preclusion grounds as either issue or claim preclusion,
but rather states that the employee “moved to dismiss the action as against
himself, and his motion was granted” and, in the quoted passage above,
refers to “the plaintiff’s right of action.”297 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion
in Lambert v. Conrad cites Spector as claim preclusion precedent.298 To
the extent that Spector can be interpreted as precluding plaintiff’s entire
claim, it provides an example where claim preclusion was applied over
issue preclusion.
However, two federal district courts in Washington applied nonmutual
claim preclusion in addition to, or instead of, issue preclusion, where the
trial court initially entered judgment for the indemnitee based on a jury
verdict of non-liability. In both opinions, the courts cited Section 51 and
framed the relationship between the principal and agent in terms of privity.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Evans Fruit Co.,299
plaintiff-intervenors sued Evans Fruit and its employee, Marin, alleging
sexual harassment by Marin “acting in the course and scope of his duties
and . . . at all times acting for and on behalf of Evans Fruit.”300 After the
court first tried the claims against Evans Fruit, the jury returned a verdict
“finding that none of the Plaintiffs–Intervenors established by a
preponderance of the evidence that she was subjected to a sexually hostile
work environment while employed at Evans Fruit.”301 The district court
then dismissed the claims against Marin “on the basis of either claim or
issue preclusion.”302 Citing Section 51, and framing the issue in terms of
privity between employer and employee, the court ruled:

296. Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
297. Id. (emphases added).
298. See Lambert v. Conrad, 536 F.2d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing Spector, 263
F.2d at 143)
299. EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., No. CV-10-3033-LRS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102677
(E.D. Wash. July 22, 2013).
300. Id. at *2–3 (citation omitted).
301. Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
302. Id. at *13.
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Because of the verdict in the trial against Evans Fruit, the
Plaintiffs–Intervenors are precluded from pursuing in a separate trial what
is, for all intents and purposes, the same WLAD claim against Marin. The
employer-employee relationship between Evans Fruit and Marin is
sufficient to establish ‘privity’ between them. Plaintiffs–Intervenors sought
to impose vicarious liability on Evans Fruit for alleged sexual harassment
by its employee, Marin.303

In Davis Wright & Jones v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh,304 an insurance company sued the bank to which it had issued a
policy, asserting a vicarious liability claim against the bank that alleged
that the bank had fraudulently induced the company to issue the policy.305
After trial, judgment was entered for the bank based on a jury verdict that
“absolved [the bank] of the charge that it had made misrepresentations in
the insurance application with intent to deceive National Union.”306 In a
subsequent declaratory judgment action by the bank’s attorneys, Davis
Wright & Jones, “requesting [the] court to declare that, pursuant to the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, all cognizable claims
which National Union alleges against Davis Wright are barred by the
orders and judgments entered in [the prior lawsuit].”307 The district could
have applied nonmutual claim preclusion to conclude that “the identity of
interests between [the Bank] and [its law firm] is sufficient to preclude [the
insurance company] from relitigating against [the law firm] the case it lost
against [the Bank].”308 This outcome made sense, the court reasoned,
because:
At the end of the trial, the jury absolved [the bank] of the charge that it had
made misrepresentations in the insurance application with intent to deceive
[the insurance company]. In doing so, the jury must necessarily have
concluded that Davis Wright had not committed the alleged insurance fraud
either. Otherwise, based on the jury instruction that any [of the Bank’s]
agent’s knowing misrepresentations to [the insurance company] during the
insurance application process were to be imputed to [the Bank], the jury
would have held [the Bank] liable based on Davis Wright’s wrongful
behavior.309
303. Evans Fruit, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102677, at *7 (emphases added). “WLAD” is
short for Washington Law Against Discrimination, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.030,
49.60.180 (West 2008).
304. Davis Wright & Jones v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 709 F. Supp. 196
(W.D. Wash. 1989).
305. Id. at 197.
306. Id. at 203.
307. Id. at 197.
308. Id. at 202.
309. Id. at 203 (footnote omitted).
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Concluding that “sufficient ‘privity’ or identity of parties does exist
between [the Bank] and Davis Wright with regard to the previously
litigated claims concerning [the Bank’s] application for excess
insurance,”310 the court expressly applied claim over issue preclusion,
finding “that [the insurance company] is precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata from bringing claims against Davis Wright based on its
participation in [the Bank’s] application for excess insurance from National
Union. Given this result, the court need not consider the applicability of
collateral estoppel.”311
Eleventh Circuit: In Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corp.,312
the Eleventh Circuit addressed, for the first time, “claim preclusion in a
case in which the party seeking its benefit is related by vicarious liability or
respondeat superior to a defendant in a prior lawsuit or, as here, is so
related to a defendant in the same lawsuit against whom claims have been
dismissed with prejudice.”313 In a suit by Citibank against Data Lease to
foreclose on collateral for a loan, Data Lease counterclaimed against the
bank and seven directors alleged to have acted as the banks agents.314 After
the directors settled with Data Lease, Citibank moved to dismiss the
remaining counterclaim based on claim preclusion.315 Noting that “Data
Lease, in its counterclaim, is seeking damages against Citibank only under
the theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability,”316 the Eleventh
Circuit, citing Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments,
concluded that “the third element of claim preclusion, i.e., privity, is met
herein.”317 Regarding the relative roles of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion, the court observed: “When claim preclusion does not apply to
bar an entire claim or set of claims, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or

310. Id. (emphasis added).
311. Id. (emphasis added).
312. Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1990). See also
Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1501–02 (11th Cir. 1991). In Pelletier, the Court of
Appeals, citing Citibank, N.A., held that Pelletier’s claim against Zweifel was precluded by
res judicata based on a finding of derivative privity between Zweifel and Culpepper, the
defendant in Pelletier’s previous shareholders’ derivative suit. Id. at 1501 (“Although
Zweifel was not a party in the [previous] shareholders’ derivative suit, Zweifel and
Culpepper’s relationship, as described by Pelletier, is one of privity. . . . Zweifel’s liability
is grounded on Culpepper’s execution of the conspiracy as Zweifel’s agent: the liability is
derivative.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
313. Citibank, N.A., 904 F.2d at 1502.
314. Id. at 1499.
315. Id. at 1500.
316. Id. at 1502 (footnote omitted).
317. Id. at 1503 (emphasis added).
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issue preclusion, may still prevent the relitigation of particular issues which
were actually litigated and decided in a prior suit.”318
B. Should Courts Apply Nonmutual Claim Preclusion in the First
Instance (or Only Where Issue Preclusion Is Not Applicable)?
The above survey of caselaw, both state and federal, reveals that a
very substantial number of jurisdictions recognize nonmutual claim
preclusion. However, Professor Clermont, while acknowledging that
courts apply nonmutual claim preclusion, comments that this doctrine is
only available to a limited extent, that is when issue preclusion is
unavailable. As mentioned earlier, he disagrees with the NCBE’s
suggested answer to MBE Question 9, that the issue preclusion defense
“will be utilized only if claim preclusion is unavailable,” expressing the
view that “[e]very court I have seen goes the standard nonmutual IP [issue
preclusion] route if it is available.”319
1.

Why Does It Matter?

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
articulated the generally-recognized relationship between claim preclusion
and the supplemental doctrine of issue preclusion: “When claim preclusion
does not apply to bar an entire claim or set of claims, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, may still prevent the relitigation of
particular issues which were actually litigated and decided in a prior
suit.”320 Section 51 of the Second Restatement of Judgments marks a
forward-looking evolution of the law away from the first Restatement’s
embrace of, by then, outdated mutuality of estoppel’s formalism and
toward a functional approach based on the reality that the claim against the
primary obligor (i.e., the indemnitor) and the persons vicariously
responsible for his conduct (i.e., the indemnitee) are “[i]n an important
sense . . . only a single claim.”321 Significantly, Section 51 does not
318. Id. at 1501 (citations omitted). Compare the court’s analysis in Pelletier:
The preclusive effect of a dismissal with prejudice, an unlitigated matter, thus is
examined under the requirements for claim preclusion. Since such a judgment is
unaccompanied by findings, it does not, however, collaterally estop the plaintiff
from raising issues that might have been litigated if the case had proceeded to
trial.
Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1501 (citations omitted).
319. Patricia W. Moore, supra note 25.
320. Citibank, 904 F.2d at 1501 (citations omitted). But see Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1501.
321. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“The
same loss is involved, usually the same measure of damages, and the same or nearly
identical issues of fact and law. . . . The optional additional security thus afforded by the
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confine nonmutual claim preclusion to judgments based on procedural
dispositions. This is consistent with the general approach to claim and
issue preclusion, which treats issue preclusion as supplemental to claim
preclusion.
In elaborating upon Illinois’s so-called Towns doctrine, the Seventh
Circuit noted the broad application of Section 51 to include the application
of nonmutual claim preclusion even in cases where the issue of the primary
obligor’s liability was actually and necessarily decided by the judgment in
the first suit:
So if you are hit by a truck and sue the truck company and lose, you
cannot resuscitate your claim by suing the truck driver unless the
company’s successful defense in the suit against it was a defense personal
to the company. If the company won its case because the jury determined
that the driver had not been negligent and therefore his employer was not
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, that would extinguish the
claim against the driver because the previous suit had exonerated him.
One might suppose that the principle which drove the result in Towns was
not res judicata (claim preclusion) but collateral estoppel (issue
preclusion)—the driver was relying on the issue of his liability having been
resolved in the suit against his employer. But then he would have to show
that the issue had been resolved in a full and fair hearing, whereas if the
suit against him is deemed a case of claim splitting all he has to show is
that the liability unsuccessfully asserted against his employer in the
previous suit was derivative from liability of himself. As the Restatement
explains (elaborating on the reasoning in the Towns opinion), the courts
rightly treat the second suit as an attempt at claim splitting . . . .322

The national survey reveals a split among jurisdictions, with some
courts applying nonmutual claim preclusion only where the prior suit was
dismissed on procedural grounds, and others doing so even where issue
preclusion might have been an applicable alternative ground, consistent
with Section 51. Applying nonmutual claim preclusion to all situations
embraced by Section 51 (rather than as a fallback if issue preclusion is not
available) is hardly a radical transformation of the law. It is, rather, the
next logical step in the law’s development, which has released preclusion
law from the tether of the outdated mutuality principle (and, with it, the
so-called narrow and broad exceptions to nonmutual issue preclusion which
flowed from the mutuality principle). Consistency in approach to

rules of vicarious responsibility should not . . . afford the injured person a further option to
litigate successively the issues upon which his claim to redress is founded. He is ordinarily
in a position to sue both obligors in the same action and may justly be expected to do so.”).
322. Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
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nonmutual claim preclusion across jurisdictions would further promote
coherence in this corner of preclusion law.
Furthermore, applying nonmutual claim preclusion, over issue
preclusion, saves both the court and litigant time and expense by
eliminating the time-consuming task of probing the record of the prior
proceeding to establish that the issue of nonliability had been fully and
fairly resolved.
2.

The Split Among Jurisdictions

The survey reveals that a significant number of decisions, involving
vicarious liability relationships, have either (1) applied claim preclusion
over available issue preclusion, (2) stated in dictum that claim preclusion
should be applied first if applicable, or (3) consistent with Professor
Clermont’s view, applied nonmutual claim preclusion only where issue
preclusion was unavailable.
A substantial number of courts cited in the survey apply nonmutual
claim preclusion in cases where issue preclusion might have been
applicable.323

323. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Cormier, 745 F.3d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 2014); Gonzales v.
Hernandez, 175 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999); Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 56
F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1995) (judgment in favor of corporation’s subsidiary based on
jury verdict held to preclude claim against parent corporation); Fiumara v. Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Cos., 746 F.2d 87, 90 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984); Cognate Bioservs., Inc. v. Smith, No. CCB13-1797, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30649, at *21 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2016); LaMie v. Wright,
No. 1:12-cv-1299, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92191, at *3 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 2014); U.S. ex
rel Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 860 F. Supp. 370, 374 (S.D. Tex. 1994);
Davis Wright & Jones v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 709 F. Supp. 196, 203
(W.D. Wash. 1989); Peppmeier v. Murphy, 708 N.W.2d 57, 64 (Iowa 2005); Ford v. New
Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 891 P.2d 546, 555 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Ensley v. Pitcher, 22
P.3d 99, 106–07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); Kuhlman v. Thomas, 897 P.2d 365, 369 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1995). See also Garver v. Brown & Co. Sec. Corp., 96 Civ. 2507 (JGK), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1454, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998) (applying claim preclusion, rather
than issue preclusion, despite its finding that “the ‘issue of the proper allocation of the
stocks and bonds in the plaintiff’s brokerage account was clearly litigated during the divorce
action.’” (quoting Garver v. Garver, 96 Civ. 2507 (JGK), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1113, at
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1997))). The Garver court observed in a footnote:
The defendant [Brown] argues in its brief that this Court previously granted
summary judgment in favor of John Garver [the ex-husband] on the basis of
collateral estoppel, and that Brown is entitled to summary judgment on the same
basis. However, the Court granted John Garver’s motion under the res judicata
doctrine.
Id. at *7 n.1 (citations omitted). Accord EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., No. CV-10-3033-LRS,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102677, at *12 (E.D. Wash. July 22, 2013). In Evans Fruit, the
court observed:
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Other courts considered issue preclusion only after first determining
that nonmutual claim preclusion was inapplicable or, on the other hand,
unnecessary to reach issue preclusion after first finding nonmutual claim
preclusion applicable.324
Finally, consistent with Professor Clermont’s view, a significant body
of caselaw cited in the survey considered, and then rejected, issue
preclusion before addressing claim preclusion.325 Three other decisions not
cited above, out of the District of Columbia Circuit,326 the Supreme Court
Plaintiffs–Intervenors’ WLAD claims against Marin are barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion, but even assuming the WLAD claims against him
and Evans Fruit are somehow materially distinguishable, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel would nonetheless preclude relitigation in a trial against Marin of the
issue of whether he subjected any of the Plaintiffs–Intervenors to a sexually
hostile work environment. That precise issue was actually litigated and decided in
the trial against Evans Fruit, and it was essential to the verdict rendered in that
trial.
Id.
324. See Wayne Cty. Hosp. v. Jakobson, 567 F. App’x 314, 321 (6th Cir. 2014)
(examining claim preclusion first, although the issue of the doctor’s negligence had been
determined by the jury, and finding that the hospital and the doctor were not “in privity,”
thereafter examining issue preclusion which, under Kentucky law, was not required); Turner
v. Crawford Square Apartments, 449 F.3d 542, 549 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying claim
preclusion while noting that “collateral estoppel, known as issue preclusion, also likely bars
Turner’s action.”); Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005, 1007 (3d
Cir. 1987); deLeon v. Slear, 616 A.2d 380, 385 (Md. 1992); Soto v. Phillips, 836 S.W.2d
266, 270 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (while it is unclear whether the same issue asserted against
the employer was decided in the prior suit against the employer, the court considered claim
preclusion first, and then addressed issue preclusion on a different claim after concluding
that “[t]hat claim could not have been made in the first suit.”); Landess v. Schmidt, 340
N.W.2d 213, 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). See also Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103
(Tex. 1985) (“The effect of the prior federal court judgment on the present cause must be
examined in terms of res judicata first, and then if necessary, collateral estoppel. While
courts are prone to confuse these two doctrines and use them interchangeably, it is important
to distinguish the two and consider them separately because a ruling that res judicata bars
these claims will eliminate our need to analyze collateral estoppel.” (citations omitted)).
325. See Krepps v. Reiner, 377 F. App’x 65, 67 (2d Cir. 2010); Falbaum v. Pomerantz,
19 F. App’x 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2001); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1287 (5th
Cir. 1989); Xu v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 11339 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78404
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2010); Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 677 F. Supp. 710, 717 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 637 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (considering issue
preclusion first because defendant in the current suit “first moved to dismiss Tamari’s action
in this case on grounds of collateral estoppel.”); Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chancler Armentrout
& Roebuck, P.C., 447 S.E.2d 101, 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Creech v. Addington, 281
S.W.3d 363, 374 (Tenn. 2009).
326. Lober v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1969). An injured passenger’s negligence
suit against the cab company resulted in a jury verdict finding the driver not negligent. Id.
at 715. In a subsequent suit by the injured passenger against the cab driver, the court,
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of Arkansas,327 and the Colorado Supreme Court,328 applied issue
preclusion over claim preclusion.
C. Nonmutual Claim Preclusion as an Extension of Privity or an
Exception to Privity: The Case for Recognizing Nonmutual Privity in
Vicarious Liability Relationships
Although privity is just a conclusion that a nonparty should be bound
by a judgment, the concept is central to claim preclusion doctrine. As
noted in Moore’s Federal Practice, “[a]lthough the courts have not
succeeded in articulating a rule that defines those relationships that are
sufficient to create privity, the concept of privity is still deeply embedded
in claim preclusion doctrine.”329 It is, therefore, worth asking: where
nonmutual claim preclusion is available, is it doctrinally justified as an
exception to privity, similar to the broad and narrow exceptions to
mutuality of collateral estoppel, or as an extension of privity to include yet
another substantive legal relationship under that label? As mentioned in
this Article’s introduction, Professor Clermont agrees with Wright, Miller,
and Cooper’s view that nonmutual claim preclusion is justified, not as an
extension of privity concept, but as an exception to privity.330 Rejecting the
concept of nonmutual privity as promoting doctrinal incoherence, Wright,
Miller, and Cooper comment:
One means adopted to accomplish nonmutual claim preclusion is to state
that the party invoking preclusion is in privity with a party to the earlier
action although the circumstances would not support a finding of privity to
invoke preclusion against the new party. Although the results may be
laudable, there is a price to be paid for this approach. Bogus findings of
although using the term res judicata, appeared to have applied collateral estoppel in holding
that “negligence issue on which [the injured passenger] was proclaimed the loser by the
adjudication there could not be subject to relitigation here.” Id. at 718.
327. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Wilson, 864 S.W.2d 244 (Ark. 1993). There, the court
declined to address the res judicata issue of whether privity existed based on its decision that
collateral estoppel applied. Id. at 247 (“Additional defendants are named in the [current]
suit . . . . In response to this argument it is contended that these parties are privies to the
original parties for purposes of res judicata. We need not address this argument, as the
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the issues presented in [plaintiff’s] lawsuit against the
additional parties.”).
328. Carpenter v. Young, 773 P.2d 561, 569 (Colo. 1989) (“Generally, a summary
judgment exonerating an employee of negligence which is not appealed is a dismissal on the
merits and bars a subsequent respondeat superior action against the employer. Such a bar
arises by virtue of collateral estoppel and consequently applies only if the judgment is
final.” (citations omitted)).
329. 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 131.40[3][a].
330. Patricia W. Moore, supra note 25.
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privity may cloud reasoning as later courts confront real privity questions,
and may prevent the court from considering and articulating the factors that
make it appropriate to allow nonmutual claim preclusion.331

Taking the opposite view, Moore’s Federal Practice observes that
“[g]enerally, an employer-employee or agent-principal relationship will
provide the necessary privity or other close relationship for claim
preclusion with respect to matters within the scope of the relationship, no
matter which party is first sued.”332 The issue whether nonmutual claim
preclusion is an extension of, or an exception to, privity is not merely a
useless academic exercise in doctrinal hair-splitting, but has been
recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Lubrizol:
[W]e make no broad pronouncements about the doctrines of mutuality or
privity in this circuit. It is enough for present purposes to decide that,
whether considered an “exception” to mutuality, or an “extension” of
privity, the vicarious liability relationship between Exxon and its
employees Evans and Lower, which forms the only asserted basis for
Exxon’s liability for the computer dispute, justifies claim preclusion.333

The goal of doctrinal coherence in the area of nonmutual claim
preclusion is served by extending the concept of privity to include
indemnitor-indemnitee relationships in the context of vicarious liability,
thus adding them to the categories of substantive legal relationships that are
currently recognized as justifying nonparty preclusion. In the formalist
heyday of the mutuality rule, the traditional concept of privity was
narrowly defined334 to apply to a limited set of substantive legal
The mutuality principle “established a pleasing
relationships.335
symmetry—a judgment was binding only on parties and persons in privity
with them, and a judgment could be invoked only by parties and their
331. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4464.1, at 713 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
332. 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 131.40[3][f].
333. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1289 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
334. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4449, at 351.
335. See, e.g., Jackson v. Dow Chem. Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Pa. 2012). The
court observed:
Claim preclusion bars the re-litigation of claims against both the parties to
the prior suit and those in privity with them. The traditional concept of privity
was limited to a set of substantive legal relationships, like bailor and bailee. But
the concept has been pragmatically expanded, and claim preclusion may now be
applied whenever “there is a close or significant relationship between successive
defendants.”
Id. at 670 (citations omitted) (quoting Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d
Cir. 1991)).
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privies.”336 Traditionally, therefore, privity was linked to, and therefore
circumscribed by, the mutuality principle so that indemnitors and
indemnitees who invoked nonmutual preclusion in an attempt to bind a
plaintiff with a favorable judgment in a prior proceeding could not be
considered in privity because they could not have been bound by an
unfavorable judgment in that proceeding.337
The privity concept has evolved from its formalist roots, firmly
planted in the soil of the mutuality principle, into a legal conclusion,
supported by a functional,338 “independent analysis” that “look[s] directly
to the reasons for holding a person bound by a judgment”339 and to the
“totality of the circumstances.”340 This “elusive and manipulable concept”
is currently determined by inquiring whether “the relationship between the
one who is a party on the record and the non-party is sufficiently close to
afford application of the principle of preclusion.”341 However, to provide a
“framework”342 to guide this case-by-case functional mode of privity
analysis, courts and the Second Restatement of Judgments have adopted a
modified categorical approach that recognizes a variety of substantive legal
relationships that justify the conclusion of privity.343 As noted in Moore’s
336. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 677.
337. Id. § 4448, at 326 (“In traditional terminology, it has been said that a judgment is
binding only on parties and persons in “privity” with a party. Under traditional rules of the
not-so-distant past, it was said that the principle of mutuality conferred the preclusion
benefits of a favorable judgment only on persons who would have been bound by an
unfavorable judgment . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
338. Id. (“Both the privity label and the mutuality rule are losing their former capacity to
deter functional analysis.”); 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 131.40[3][a]
(“Concept of Privity is Defined Functionally.”).
339. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4448, at 326–27 (“As to privity,
current decisions look directly to the reasons for holding a person bound by a judgment.
This method should be adopted generally, so that a privity label is either discarded entirely
or retained as no more than a convenient means of expressing conclusions that are supported
by independent analysis.” (footnote omitted)).
340. Criterion 508 Sols., Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Servs., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 1078,
1089 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“To determine whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor, the court must look at the totality of circumstances surrounding the
employment.”).
341. Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added)
(quoting Sw. Airlines v. Tex. Int’l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1977)).
342. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 n.6 (2008) (“The list that follows is meant
only to provide a framework for our consideration of virtual representation, not to establish
a definitive taxonomy.”).
343. Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (“Moreover, although there
are clearly constitutional limits on the ‘privity’ exception, the term ‘privity’ is now used to
describe various relationships between litigants that would not have come within the
traditional definition of that term.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (AM.
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Federal Practice: “[Privity] does not serve well as a touchstone for
determining whether a particular relationship with a party to litigation will
result in preclusion. Rather, it describes those relationships that the courts
have already determined will qualify for preclusion.”344
The suggested approach would, in effect, be a general rule that privity
exists between indemnitor and indemnitee sufficient to support the
application of nonmutual claim preclusion in derivative liability
relationships, subject to an exception in those cases where it would be
unfair to the claimant as, for example, where “[t]here may have been good
reasons for the party-joinder decisions made in the first action.”345
Most courts cited in the survey in Section II.A that have applied
nonmutual claim preclusion do so based on the determination that there is a
sufficiently close relationship between parties to an indemnity relationship
to support the conclusion that they are in privity. Eighteen state
jurisdictions out of the twenty-six surveyed framed their nonmutual claim
preclusion analyses in terms of privity. Of the eight federal circuits
surveyed, all of which apply nonmutual claim preclusion, six do so
explicitly on the basis of privity.346
LAW INST. 1982))). See also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 n.8 (2008). That
footnote provides:
The substantive legal relationships justifying preclusion are sometimes
collectively referred to as “privity.” [See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517
U.S. 792 (1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW INST.
1982) § 62 cmt. a.] The term “privity,” however, has also come to be used more
broadly, as a way to express the conclusion that nonparty preclusion is appropriate
on any ground. [See 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4449, at
351–53 & n.33] (collecting cases). To ward off confusion, we avoid using the
term “privity” in this opinion.
Id. Accord Criterion 508 Sols., Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Servs., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 1078,
1093 (S.D. Iowa 2009). The court in Criterion explained:
In the traditional context, claim preclusive effects of a judgment were limited
to parties who would have been bound by a judgment, otherwise known as the
“rule of mutuality.” There is increasing authority, however, in favor of extending
claim preclusion to derivative liability relationships because the party asserting
preclusion should have been joined in the original litigation. Courts have
embraced a litmus test for extending claim preclusion to non-original parties
depending largely on the degree of privity between the affected parties; where
there is insufficient privity between parties, courts have rejected extending claim
preclusion.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note
9, § 4463 at 677).
344. 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 131.40[3][a].
345. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4464.1 at 730.
346. If the First Circuit is also included as recognizing nonmutual privity, the number
would increase to seven. See Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., 962 F.2d 1169, 1174 (5th Cir.
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CONCLUSION
So what is the “correct” answer to the sample MBE Question 9:
Choice (A) claim preclusion or choice (B) issue preclusion? As noted
earlier, Professor Clermont concluded: “A court would go [with] answer 2
[i.e., (B)]. But I think an academic could construct an argument for
Answer 1 [i.e., (A)].”347 This Article suggests that nonmutual claim
preclusion should be the correct answer for the sake of doctrinal coherence
and is the correct answer based on the above survey of applicable caselaw.
The varied responses by civil procedure scholars to this
multiple-choice question demonstrate the need to provide a measure of
doctrinal coherence to this area of preclusion law. The law of preclusion
has moved progressively away from the formalist rule of mutuality that had
traditionally served as the basis for the so-called narrow and broad
exceptions to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. As a consequence of the
erosion of mutuality, most courts now, in effect, apply those exceptions to
claim preclusion but do so by expanding the concept of privity to include
vicarious liability relationships.
Research set forth in this Article also reveals that a substantial number
of American jurisdictions apply nonmutual claim preclusion in the first
instance, even where issue preclusion would have otherwise been available.
Adding derivative liability relationships to the recognized categories of
substantive legal relationships that “are sometimes collectively referred to
as ‘privity’”348 and applying nonmutual claim preclusion, rather than issue
preclusion, is—and as a matter of policy should be—the next logical step
in the evolution of preclusion law. As noted by Wright, Miller, and
Cooper, “[c]laim preclusion often provides the simplest means of avoiding
successive actions against the indemnitor and then against the
indemnitee.”349 Claim preclusion spares litigants and the courts the burden
of probing the record of proceedings in the prior action to search for issues
that were actually and necessarily determined. This simpler, more direct,
approach would also add some measure of coherence to preclusion
doctrine. The continued erosion of the symmetrically pleasing doctrine of
mutuality has created space for expanding the privity concept to include
nonmutual privity.

1992) (“Several circuits [citing the First, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits] have
considered whether a vicarious liability relationship constitutes sufficient privity to merit the
application of claim preclusion.”).
347. Patricia W. Moore, supra note 25.
348. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 n.8 (2008).
349. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, § 4463, at 684.
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